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1. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TAX HARMONIZATION 
A. Introduction 
Just as the U.S. Congress is most productive during the last few 
months of a legislative session, so too, the European Community (EC) 1 
made most of its progress on corporate tax harmonization2 to date in 
the last few years before the 1992 deadline for the completion of the 
internal market. Actually, use of the term tax harmonization is mislead-
ing, insofar as it means the establishment of identical tax bases, rates, 
and systems throughout the EC as a result of action at the Community 
level. It is only by abandoning the concept of full tax harmonization 
and substituting the concepts of "coordination"3 and "approximation"4 
that there has been any agreement on direct taxation matters.5 In 1990, 
the EC Commissioner for taxation, Mrs. Christiane Scrivener, stated 
that the European Commission had abandoned its goal of full harmoni-
zation of direct taxation in the EC for a more practical approach-con-
vergence of the respective corporate tax systems. This new approach 
incorporates the principle of subsidiarity which, for tax harmonization, 
1 Prior to the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Community (EC) was known as the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Treaty of the European Union and Final Act, 7 Feb. 1992, art. 
G(l), 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty of Maastricht also created the European 
Union (EU). which had previously been known as the European Communities and to which all 
the Member States belong. Id. The EU consists of the EC and the other pan-European bodies: 
the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Id. art. 
A; see also Name Changes in Europe, SACRAMENTO BEE. Jan. 2, 1994, at A12. 
2 Full harmonization means the establishment of identical tax bases, rates, systems, etc., 
throughout the EC as a result of action at the Community level by the Commission or other 
agencies of the Community such as the European Court of Justice. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION 
19 (1992) [hereinafter Ruding Report]. See generally Int'l Monetary Fund, Tax Harmonization in 
the European Community: Policy Issues and Analysis. in OCCASIONAL PAPER 94 (George Kopits ed., 
1992). 
3 Coordination refers to any action in the form of directives, conventions, recommendations, 
guidelines, etc., taken by the Commission or an EC Member State to affect the tax practices of 
the member countries. Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 19. 
4 Approximation means the establishment of a range of possibilities for the Member States to 
choose from--choices outside that range are not allowable. Marlin Risinger, Address at the 
National Tax Association Tax Institute of America 4 (Oct. 12, 1992). 
5 The EC Commissioner for taxation, Mrs. Christiane Scrivener, issued a communication in 
1990 setting forth guidelines on company taxation and the measures the Commission thought 
necessary to establish and further develop the internal market. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO PARLIAMENT AND TO THE COUNCIL-GUIDELINES 
ON COMPANY TAXATION SEC (90) 601 final [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON COMPANY TAXATION]. 
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means that Member States should determine their own tax arrange-
ments, except to the extent that major distortions would occur.6 
The goal of the EEC Treaty, which created the European Economic 
Community, was to create a single, integrated European Market.7 To 
realize this goal, physical barriers to trade in the form of border 
controls, had to be removed. This required harmonizing indirect taxes 
such as value-added taxes (VAT) because tax differences like variations 
in the VAT rates are a primary reason for border controls in the first 
place. Direct taxes, such as corporate income taxes, can inhibit the free 
movement of capital. 
The First and Second Council Directives laid the foundation in 1967 
for the EC's common VAT system,8 establishing the basic principles, 
structure, and method of application of this system.9 The Sixth VAT 
Directive replaced most of the First Directive and all of the Second 
Directive with a uniform basis of assessment. 1O More importantly, this 
Directive specified that the VAT would be responsible for partly financ-
ing the Community itselfY This key role for the VAT partly explains 
the substantial progress made with respect to indirect tax harmoniza-
tion as compared to direct tax harmonization. 
Slow but steady progress continued as the Council adopted a direc-
tive on the approximation of VAT rates on October 19, 1992.12 This 
Directive establishes a minimum standard VAT rate of fifteen percent 
and a minimum reduced VAT rate of five percentP Currently, busi-
6Id. at 2. The Maastricht Treaty now defines subsidiarity as the principle that, except in the 
areas where the Community has exclusive competence, it should only act when Member States 
cannot sufficiently achieve the objectives. TEU, supra note 1, art. G(5). 
7 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter EEC Treaty or 
Treaty of Rome]. The term 'EEC Treaty' will be used to refer to the original treaty prior to the 
amendments brought about by the TEU. The term 'Treaty of Rome' will be used to refer to the 
original treaty after the amendments brought about by TEU. The EEC Treaty established the 
European Economic Community as of January 1, 1958. 
8 Council Directive 67/227 on the Harmonization of the Legislation of Member States on 
Turnover Taxes, 1967 OJ. (L 71); Council Directive 67/228 on Turnover Taxes, 1967 OJ. (L 
71). 
9 Coopers & Lybrand, Value Added Tax, EC Commentaries, Nov. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, 
World Library, Eurcom File, § 2.1 [hereinafter VAT]. The adoption of the VAT is a mandatory 
condition of membership in the EC. Id. 
10 Council Directive 77/388 on the Harmonization of the Laws of the Member States Relating 
to Turnover Taxes-Common System of Value Added Tax: Uniform Basis of Assessment, 1977 OJ. 
(L 145). 
11 VAT, supra note 9, § 2.1. 
12 Council Directive 92/77 on the Approximation of VAT Rates, 1992 OJ. (L 316). 
13Id. art. 1; see also VAT, supra note 9, § 2.16. Member States are permitted to have up to two 
lower rates of at least five percent on a wide range of products. Id. 
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nesses pay VAT in the country of consumption of the goods, but the 
Commissioner is preparing a paper on a VAT regime that would allow 
for payment of the VAT in the country of origin.14 Further discussion 
of the harmonization of indirect taxes is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is important to realize that the loss of sovereignty in the 
indirect tax area means that the Member States are anxious to retain 
as much flexibility as possible to collect revenue through direct taxes. 
This article examines the status of direct tax harmonization in the 
EC, the implications to the United States of the actions taken so far, 
and makes recommendations for future actions by the United States. 
Part I of this article explains that the historical background and legal 
basis for tax legislation in the EC is partly responsible for the initial 
slow pace of direct tax harmonization legislation. An understanding of 
the legislative process and the participants involved in enacting EC tax 
legislation provides further insights. The structures of the Member 
States' varied tax systems also shed light on the difficulties in reaching 
tax harmonization agreements. 
Part II of the article discusses the implications of these tax harmoni-
zation agreements, limited at this point to the Parent-Subsidiary Di-
rective, the Mergers Directive, and the Arbitration Convention, for the 
European Community. This section concludes that complete harmoni-
zation of the EC's corporate tax laws is neither likely nor necessary, 
but movement toward more uniformity is inevitable. 
Part III of the article analyzes the implications of European harmoni-
zation for U.S. tax policy. The provisions of subpart F of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which indirectly allow taxation of the foreign income 
of foreign corporations in certain situations, are reexamined in light 
of the tax harmonization developments in the EC.15 The Parent-Sub-
sidiary and Mergers Directives provide compelling reasons for U.S. 
multinationals to form European holding companies, however, such 
corporate structures would implicate the subpart F regime. The sub-
part F rules endeavor to impose current shareholder taxation on un-
distributed income, such as dividends and related-party sales and 
services income, earned through a foreign corporation. The article 
concludes that given appropriate safeguards, administrability, simplic-
ity, and economic efficiency can be achieved by treating the EC as a 
14YAT, supra note 9, § 7.1, see infra note 236 for further discussion of the transitional YAT 
regime. 
15 See infra notes 248-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the subpart F regime. 
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single country for purposes of the same-country exception from the 
subpart F provisions.16 
United States tax treaty policy must also take into consideration the 
direct tax harmonization accomplished thus far and the proposals for 
the future. Although the negotiation of a single treaty with the EC 
would produce significant benefits for the United States, both substan-
tively and administratively, the EC Member States are not yet willing to 
transfer to the Community their sovereignty to conclude tax treaties. 
The alternative is to strive toward uniformity in the tax treaty negotia-
tions currently underway with many of the Member States. 
The importance of examining the European experience cannot be 
overemphasized. With the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, 
the EU comprises a single market of approximately 370.5 million 
people, and the future EU could include the rest of Scandinavia and 
Eastern Europe. 17 A step in that direction was made on January 1,1994, 
when the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement established the 
world's largest free-trade zone by extending the EU's single market to 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states of Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. IS Although the EEA Agreement did not 
confer full EU membership, it allowed for the free movement of goods, 
16 See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the sam~ountry excep-
tion. 
17 Maastricht European Union Treaty to Enter Into Force, EC Delegation Says, PR Newswire, Oct. 
14,1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Prnews File; The Maastricht Recipe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 
23, 1993, at 15 [hereinafter Maastricht Recipe]. Poland, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria have all signed "Europe Agreements" with the EC which offers "associate 
membership" to these countries, but there has been no formal commitment regarding full 
membership. The Two Europes Poor Relations, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1993, at 54. In April 1994, 
Poland and Hungary formally applied for membership. EUROPEAN COMMISSION DELEGATION TO 
THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE 5 (1994) [hereinafter EU GUIDE]. Mem-
bership applications were previously received from Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus. EC: Europe Docu-
ments; No. 1790-Commission Report on the Criteria and Conditions for Accession of New Members, 
Reuters Textline Agence Europe,July 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. See 
generaUy Vincent John Ella, The Visegrad Countries of Central Europe-Integration or Isolation?, 2 
MINN.]. GLOBAL TRADE 229 (1993). Article 0 of the TEU sets forth the procedure for countries 
to accede to the EU. TEU, supra note 1, art. O. 
18 John Turro, European Economic Area Agreement To Enter Into Force January 1, 7 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 1618 (Dec. 27,1993); see also Europe Moves Closer to Single Currency, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Jan. 2, 1994, at 9A. Switzerland was the only member of the EFTA to reject membership into the 
EEA through national referendum. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE 
ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 77 (1995) [hereinafter EUROPEAN UNION]. 
Liechtenstein's membership in the EEA was temporarily suspended pending clarification of its 
special relationship with Switzerland. Id. As of May 1, 1995, Liechtenstein is also a member of 
the EEA. Id. 
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persons, services, and capital throughout the seventeen countries.19 
Then, in the spring of 1994, the Council finished negotiations with 
Austria, Sweden, Norway, and Finland so they could accede to the 
Union on January 1, 1995.20 The Austrians voted in a national referen-
dum to accept the terms of EU membership and similar referendums 
passed in Finland and Sweden, but not in Norway.21 
To achieve a coherent system of international taxation, the United 
States must take note of how other countries tax international in-
come.22 The EU is especially important, not only because of the fifteen 
Member States that currently comprise the Union, but also because of 
the countries that aspire to join. The EFTA countries in particular are 
making every effort to ensure that their tax systems comply with EC 
direct tax measures. 23 The Eastern European countries are also closely 
monitoring the tax systems of the Member States, as well as the evolving 
body of EC tax law, as these countries develop their tax systems.24 The 
tax policies pursued by this entire group will have important implica-
tions for economic conditions in the United States and the EU. 
In the international trade arena, the current trend is the formation 
of regional trading blocs.25 In 1992, the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico agreed to the terms of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) to create a trade area in which goods and services are 
exchanged free of tariffs and other trade restrictions.26 On December 
11, 1994, Chile was invited to join NAFTA.27 If negotiations are success-
19 Turro, supra note 18, at 1618. The EEA Agreement also extended the rules on competition 
and state aid. Id. 
20 Craig R. Whitney, Parliament Vote in Europe Shows Rightward Trend, N.Y. TIMEs,June 13, 1994, 
atAl, B6. 
21 Rolf Soderlind, Norway s EU "NO" a Bitter Defeat for Brundtland, Reuters World Service, Nov. 
29, 1994, available in LEXlS, Europe Library, Curnws File. 
22 Charles Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1151, 1153 
(1981). 
23 Peter Cussons, The Parent-Subsidiary and Merger Directives, 2 BRIT. TAX REv. 105, 105 (1993). 
Sweden, for example, enacted major tax reforms in 1990 that included provisions that resemble 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Mergers Directive. Leif Muten, Swedish Parliament Accepts 
Tax Program, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 23 (Jan. 3, 1994). 
24 See SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS: EC '92 AND ITs IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 9 
(Tracy A. Kaye ed., 1992) [hereinafter SEMINAR PROCEEDlNGSJ. 
25 See generally THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IX 
(Richard S. Belous and Rebecca S. Hartley eds., 1990). 
26North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 605 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTAJ. 
27 Western Hemisphere Leaders Agree to Seek Free-Trade Pact; 34 Nations Vow Trade Bloc f7y 2005, 
Facts on File World News Digest, Dec. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File 
[hereinafter FTAAJ. 
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ful, Chile's admission into NAFTA could pave the way for invitations 
to future members such as Brazil and Argentina. By 2005, the United 
States intends to join thirty-three other democracies of the Western 
Hemisphere in negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 28 The 
dispute-reconciliation and tariff-reduction procedures of NAFTA are 
expected to serve as blueprints for the Free Trade Area of the Americas.29 
Although NAFTA does not address the subject of income tax har-
monization, it is logical to presume that as cross-border activity in-
creases, NAFTA countries will increasingly feel pressure to attempt 
some harmonization of their respective tax systems.30 As the barriers 
to capital movements and physical trade are removed, the importance 
of the differences in tax systems will be heightened. The United States 
can learn valuable lessons from the tax harmonization experience of 
the EC, thus both the process of integration and the particular ap-
proach followed by the EC should be studiedY United States policy-
makers must be increasingly global rather than domestic in their focus 
and tax measures must be consistent with international tax systems.32 
B. History of the European Economic Community 
The EEC Treaty established the European Economic Community in 
1958.33 The original Member States were Belgium, France, the Federal 
28 OAS Will Work to Have Proposals Ready for June Trade Ministers Meeting. BNA International 
Business & Finance Daily, Jan. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnaibf File. President 
Clinton proposed the hemispheric free trade zone stretching from Alaska to Argentina at the 
Summit of the Americas in Miami in December, 1994. Americas-Trade: Many Obstacles to Economic 
Integration, Inter Press Service, Dec. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The 
Free Trade Area of the Americas would be the world's largest trading zone, including 850 million 
consumers with purchasing power valued at $13 trillion annually. FTAA, supra note 27. 
29 FTAA, supra note 27. 
30 Bilateral treaties are in effect between, the United States and Canada, the United States and 
Mexico, and Canada and Mexico. Protocol Amending the Convention Between United States of 
America and Canada With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, amended l7y 
the Protocols signed on June 14, 1983, Mar. 28, 1984, Nov. 9, 1995, U.S.-Can., 1 Tax Treaties 
35,807 (CCH 1995); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., available in LEXIS, 
Intlaw Library, Ibfd File; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 8, 1991, Can.-Mex., available in LEXIS, 
Intlaw Library, Ibfd File. 
31 I am not ready to say that the EU model is necessarily the right model for the NAFTA 
countries. That topic requires further study and is the subject of another article. 
32 Daniel Sandler, Foreword to PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TAX 
TREATIES AND CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION at vii (1994). 
33 EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 1. The TEU established the European Union founded on the 
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Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined in 1973, Greece in 
1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986.34 The objective of the EEC 
Treaty was to create a single common market that would increase the 
volume and the gain from trade between the Member States, thereby 
accelerating economic growth.35 
To create such a market, the Treaty contemplated the removal of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital 
between Member States.36 Approximation of indirect taxes, necessary 
for the free movement of goods, and the harmonization of direct taxes, 
particularly corporate taxes, essential to the free movement of capital, 
were viewed as major necessary steps. Coordination of personal income 
and social security taxes has not been viewed as urgent except to ensure 
through bilateral agreements that frontier and migrant workers are not 
double taxed.37 In December of 1993, the Commission adopted a 
detailed recommendation on the taxation of cross-border or frontier 
employees which seeks to reduce the differences in the taxation of 
resident and non-resident workers.38 The Commission will assess the 
actions taken by the Member States in response to the recommenda-
tion and will determine whether binding legislation is in order.39 
European Communities (the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy 
Community, and the European Coal and Steel Community). TEU, supra note 1, art. A. Only the 
European Communities have international legal status. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, 
art. 210. The TEU also formally renamed the European Economic Community the European 
Community. TEU, supra note 1, art. G(I). 
34 EMILE NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5 
(1993). Austria, Sweden, and Finland acceded to the EU on January 1, 1995. See Maastricht 
European Union Treaty to Enter lntoForce, ECDelegation Says, PRNewswire, Oct. 14, 1993, available 
in LEXIS, World Library, Prnews File; The Maastricht Recipe, supra note 17, at 25. 
35 See EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art 2. For example, the creation of a customs union, the first 
step towards a common market, was completed by 1968. EU GUIDE, supra note 17, at 12. As a 
result, trade increased among the original six Member States from $6.8 billion in 1958 to $60 
billion in 1972. ld. 
36 See EEC Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 54, 100a. 
37 SIJBREN CNOSSEN, INTRODUCTION TO TAX COORDINATION IN THE EC 3-4 (Sijbren Cnossen 
ed., 1987). The Fredersdorf Report concluded in 1978 that it was not essential to harmonize 
personal income taxes. ld. at 4l. 
38 Jonathan Schwarz, Survey of World Taxation, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at III; see Commission 
Recommendation for the Regulation on Taxation of Non-Residents, 1994 OJ. (L 39) 22; see also 
infra note 114 and accompanying text for an explanation of the authority of a recommendation 
and infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text for an explanation of the role of the Commission 
in the legislative process. 
39 Coopers & Lybrand, Direct Taxation, EC Commentaries, May 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, 
World Library, Eurcom File, § 5.1 [hereinafter Direct Tax]. 
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Articles 95 through 99 of the Treaty of Rome discuss the harmoni-
zation of indirect taxes. For example, article 95 states that Member 
States may not use internal taxes to discriminate against products 
coming from other Member States. Article 220 of the Treaty contains 
the only explicit reference to direct taxes and states that Member States 
shall enter into negotiations to eliminate double taxation.40 It is under-
stood, however, that article 100 of the Treaty, in the chapter on "Ap-
proximation of Laws," also provides a legal basis for direct taxation 
harmonization measures. This article authorizes the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, to issue directives 
for the approximation of laws that "directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the common market."4! 
In its 1980 "Report on the Scope for Convergence of Tax Systems in 
the Community," the Commission identified the elimination of border 
controls and the alignment of corporate tax burdens as the two most 
fundamental objectives.42 In June 1985, the European Council ap-
proved the Commission's White Paper on Completing the Internal 
Market which outlined a program to remove the remaining barriers to 
trade between the Member States.43 The White Paper contained a 
4() Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 220. 
41 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 100, amended lty TEU, supra note 1, art. G(21); see also 
European Documentation, Consultancy Europe Associates Ltd., 1991, EU Background-Competi-
tion and Trade-Taxation in the Single Market, Jan. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, 
Txtec File, 6 [hereinafter Taxation in the Single MarketJ. Other provisions pertaining to company 
taxation are articles 52, 58, 73b, and 221. Articles 52 and 58 are intended to guarantee freedom 
of establishment for companies constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State; 
freedom of establishment includes the right to engage in and pursue activities as self-employed 
persons as well as to set up and manage enterprises. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 52, 58. 
Article 73b is intended to ensure the free movement of capital by prohibiting restrictions on the 
movement of capital and payments between Member States as well as between Member States 
and third countries, subject to the framework provided in Chapter 4 of the treaty. Treaty of Rome, 
supra note 7, art. 73b. Under article 221, Member States are required to ensure that the other 
EC nationals receive the same treatment as their own nationals with respect to the participation 
in the capital of companies. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 221; see also Michael Daly & Joann 
Weiner, Corporate Tax Harmonization and Competition in Federal Countries: Some Lessons for the 
European Community?, 46 NAT'L TAX]. 441, 460 n.33 (1993); see infra notes 59-63 and accom-
panying text for an explanation of the Council's role in the legislative process. 
42 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council on the 
Scope for Convergence of Tax Systems in the Community, S. 1/80 BULL. OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES 
13 (1980). 
43 CNOSSEN, supra note 37, at 4-5; see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLET-
ING THE INTERNAL MARKET, WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 3 
(1985) [hereinafter WHITE PAPERJ. The European Council comprises Heads of State or Govern-
ment and the President of the Commission. The European Council meets at least twice a year, 
at the end of each Member State's six-month presidency of the Council. TEU, supra note 1, art. 
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comprehensive list of 300 measures that the Commission deemed 
necessary to complete the internal market.44 One of the three major 
chapters in the White Paper was devoted to measures related to indi-
rect taxation. With respect to direct taxation, only proposals related to 
parent companies and subsidiaries (the Parent-Subsidiary Directive), 
mergers, divisions, and contribution of assets (the Mergers Directive), 
an arbitration procedure (the Arbitration Convention), and taxes on 
securities transactions, were included in the timetable for completing 
the internal market.45 
The Single European Act (SEA) 46 was signed by the twelve Member 
States in 1986 and amended the EEC Treaty by providing for institu-
tional reform, European political cooperation, and formal extension 
of the scope of the EEC Treaty to five new policy areasY Article 13 of 
the SEA incorporated the objective of an internal market into the EEC 
Treaty48 and set December 31, 1992 as the target date for completion 
of the internal market.49 The internal market is defined as "an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, per-
sons, services, and capital is ensured ... "50 
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) was negotiated, 
in its last phase, in December 1991, was signed on February 7, 1992, 
and was ratified by all twelve Member States by October 13, 1993.51 The 
TEU became effective on November 1,1993 and created the European 
Union, "founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the 
D; Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1, art. 2 [hereinafter SEA]; see also EU GUIDE, supra 
note 17, at 9. 
44 Robert H. Aland, Europe 1992, Tax Planning for u.s. Multinationals, 68 TAXES 1072, 1074 
(Dec. 1990). The original 300 measures were subsequently reduced to 282. [d. The measures 
were divided into three categories: measures to remove physical barriers; measures to remove 
technical barriers; and measures to remove fiscal barriers. [d. 
45WHlTE PAPER, supra note 43, at 38; see infra notes 144--46 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Mergers Directive, and Arbitration Convention. 
46 SEA, supra note 43, at 4. 
47 A.G. TOTH, 1 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 482 (1990). 
48 SEA, supra note 43, art. 13 (adding a new article 8a to the EEC Treaty); see also Taxation in 
the Single Market, supra note 41, at 5. Article G(9) of the TEU renumbered article 8a to article 
7a. TEU, supra note 1, art. G(9). The internal market can be thought of as a stepping stone 
toward a common market, the objective outlined in article 2 of the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty 
of Rome, supra note 7, art. 7a; see also Johan Brands, Comment, Trade-OJ! Between Subsidiarity 
and Neutrality, in TAXATION OF CRoss-BORDER INCOME, HARMONIZATION, AND TAX NEUTRALITY 
UNDER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 35, 36 n.52 (1994). 
49 Aland, supra note 44, at 1073. 
50 SEA, supra note 43, art. 13; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 7a. 
51 Maastricht Recipe, supra note 17, at 15. 
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policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. "52 It com-
mits most of the Member States to follow a particular route to eco-
nomic and monetary union (EMU) ,53 in particular, the achievement of 
a single European currency for many Member States by the year 2000.54 
Article 3b formally incorporates the general principle of subsidiarity 
(making decisions at the lowest practicable level of government) into 
the EEC Treaty.55 The TEU also makes various changes to the EC 
institutions. 56 
C. Formation of European Community Tax Legislation 
The EEC Treaty established an institutional system which enables 
the Community to enact legislation that is equally binding on all of its 
members.57 Three Community institutions are involved in the produc-
tion ofEC legislation: the Council, the Commission, and the European 
Parliament. The Economic and Social Committee acts as an advisor to 
the Council and the Commission.58 
The Council consists of representatives of the Member States, usually 
the ministers responsible for the subject matter under discussion.59 For 
example, the Finance Ministers meet with respect to tax and other 
economic matters and are known as the Economy and Finance Council 
(ECOFIN).60 The foreign ministers are usually responsible for major 
overall policy decisions; the Council's Presidency rotates between the 
ministers at six-month intervals. 61 The Council is the principal law-
52 TEU, supra note 1, art. A; see also EU GUIDE, supra note 17, at 3. 
53 Europe's Monetary Future: From here to EMU, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993, at 25. 
54 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 109j (4); Patrick Oster, Europe Finds Economic Unity Elusive 
Dream; Protectionism, Regulation Slow Efforts to Create Single Market, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1994, 
at HI; see infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text for further discussion of EMU. 
55 EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 3b, amended by TEU, supra note 1, art. G(5); see supra note 6 
and accompanying text for further explanation of the subsidiarity principle. 
56 See infra notes 59, 77 and accompanying text. 
57 EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 18, at 26. 
58 GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 50 (1993); 
A.D. FREESTONE &].S. DAVIDSON, THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 55-90 (1988); TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 8-47 
(2d ed. 1988); see also Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 4. 
59Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 146, amended by TEU, supra note 1, art. G(43); see 
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 18, at 26; see also FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 58, at 70; 
HARTLEY, supra note 58, at 14. Mter the TEU went into effect, the Council was renamed the 
Council of the European Union because it now has expanded powers as set forth in Titles V and 
VI of the TEU. EU GUIDE, supra note 17, at 8. 
60 See Lobbying, in SINGLE EUR. MARKET REp. 2-A, 2-4 (Baker & McKenzie ed., 1989). 
61 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 146, amended by TEU, supra note 1, art. G(43); see 
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maker of the Community, although it can act only on a proposal from 
the Commission, except in a few narrowly defined areas.62 The Council 
may also request the Commission to undertake studies on particular 
questions and to submit proposals for legislation.63 
As of January 1995, the Commission consists of twenty members who 
are appointed by mutual agreement between the member govern-
ments for a five-year term.64 These Commissioners are required to act 
in complete independence of their own governments and the Council, 
and for the good of the Community.65 Each Commissioner is assigned 
one or more portfolios and becomes the political head of one or 
several Directorates-Genera1.66 In 1989, the Commission set up a post 
solely concerned with tax harmonization with Mrs. Christiane Scriv-
ener as the first Commissioner for taxation.67 
The Commission formulates Community policy, makes proposals to 
the Council, and drafts the detailed measures needed for their imple-
mentation.68 The Commission must also ensure that the Treaties and 
Community law are respected and applied, and must act on any in-
fringements. This includes referring matters to the Court of Justice, if 
necessary.6g 
BERMANN, supra note 58, at 51; FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 58, at 67; HARTLEY, supra 
note 58, at 14. Germany held the presidency through December 31,1994, and France and Spain, 
respectively, held the presidency during the two six-month terms of 1995. Coopers & Lybrand, 
EC Institutions and the Decision Making Process, EC Commentaries, Aug. 11, 1994, available in 
LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File, § 3.3 [hereinafter EC Institutions]. Italy will hold the EC 
presidency for the first six-month term of 1996. Reuter EC Report Long Term Diary, The Reuter 
European Community Report, July 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuec File. 
62 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 152. 
63Id. art. 145; see also BERMANN, supra note 58, at 51-52. 
64 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 157-158. The Commission, formerly 17 members, now 
has 20 members as the EU has enlarged to 15 Member States. Institutional Implications on 
Norwegian "NO," The Reuter European Community Report, Dec. 1, 1994, available in LEXlS, 
World Library, Reuec File [hereinafter Institutional Implications]; see also EC Institutions, supra 
note 61, § 3.2. 
65 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 157; Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single 
Commission of the European Communities (Merger Treaty), 1965, art. 10(2); BERMANN, supra 
note 58, at 57; FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 58, at 57; HARTLEY, supra note 58, at 8-9; see 
also EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 18, at 26. 
66 FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 58, at 59-60; HARTLEY, supra note 58, at 10. 
67KPMG, 1992 GETTING READY-A BRIEFING FOR TAX PROFESSIONALS app. 3 (1989). The new 
Commissioner for taxation is Mr. Mario Monti. EU Commission Backtracks on Environment Tax 
Draft, The Reuter European Community Report, May 10, 1995, available in LEXlS, World Library, 
Txtnws File. 
68 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 155. 
69Id. art. 169; see also EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 18, at 29; BERMANN, supra note 58, at 292; 
FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 58, at 61-62. 
1996] EUROPEAN TAX HARMONIZATION 121 
The European Parliament consists of 626 members, directly elected 
every five years. The most recent election was held in June 1994.70 At 
that time, the 567 seats were broken down as follows: Germany, 99; 
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, 87 each; Spain, 64; the Neth-
erlands, 31; Belgium, Greece, and Portugal, 25 each; Denmark, 16; 
Ireland, 15; and Luxembourg, 6.71 When Finland, Sweden, and Austria 
acceded to the EU on January 1, 1995,72 the number of seats increased 
to 626, affording Austria 21 seats, Finland 16, and Sweden 22.73 
While the EEC Treaty defined the role of the European Parliament 
as advisory and supervisory, the legislative role of the Parliament has 
been steadily increasing.74 For example, Parliament's role was enhanced 
by the cooperation procedure introduced in the SEA.75 The coopera-
tion procedure provides the European Parliament two opportunities 
to comment on certain draft legislation, but is generally not applicable 
to legislation with respect to indirect or direct tax harmonization.76 
70 EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 18, at 29; BERMANN, supra note 58, at 65; Tyler Marshall, EU 
Voters Tum Against Established Parties; Europe: Governments in Britain, France and Spain Receive 
Sharp Rebukes, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1994, at A7, Bl. 
7l NOEL, supra note 34, at 6; see also BERMANN, supra note 58, at 64; Marshall, supra note 70, 
at A7; EC Institutions, supra note 61, § 3.5. 
72 European Union: Rocky Transition from Twelve to Fifteen, European Report, Jan. 6, 1995, 
availablR in LEXIS, Europe Library, Curnws File; see Council Decision 95/1 of January 1, 1995, 
Adjusting the Instruments Concerning the Accession of New Member States, 1995 OJ. (L 1) 
(Euratom, ECSC). 
73 EU Enlargement: Implications of Norwegian "No" Vote, European Report, Dec. 7, 1994, availablR 
in LEXIS, World Library, Eurrpt File. Members of the European Parliament from the newly 
acceding countries have initially been designated by the three countries' national parliaments 
and will be directly elected within the two years following accession. Institutional Implications, 
supra note 64. 
74EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 137; BERMANN, supra note 58, at 64; FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, 
supra note 58, at 71. New article 138b permits Parliament to ask the Commission to submit 
legislative proposals. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 138b. Furthermore, the 1992 TEU actually 
gives Parliament a form of co-decision on certain types of legislation while retaining the coop-
eration procedure or the consultation procedure for others. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 
189b, amended by TEU, supra note 1, art. G(I); BERMANN, supra note 58, at 63--68; see infra note 
77 for a description of the co-decision procedure. 
75 SEA, supra note 43, art. 6; see also BERMANN, supra note 58, at 66; FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, 
supra note 58, at 76-78; HARTLEY, supra note 58, at 32-34. 
76 HARTLEY, supra note 58, at 32-33. Under the cooperation procedure, the Council must adopt 
a common position, tentative approval of the text in question, by a qualified majority. BERMANN, 
supra note 58, at 89-90. This position is then referred to the Parliament for a second reading 
after which one of the following transpires: 
1) the Parliament approves the position or fails to make a decision, in which case the 
Council must adopt the common position; or 
2) the Parliament rejects the common position in which case it may only be adopted by 
unanimous vote of the Council; or 
3) the Parliament proposes amendments to the position, in which case the Council can 
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Parliament's role was further expanded by the Treaty on European 
Union.77 
The Economic and Social Committee was established by the EEC78 
and EURATOM79 treaties to involve various economic and social inter-
est groups in the establishment of the Common Market. The Commit-
tee has 222 members who represent employers, employees, and other 
interests.8o The members are appointed by the unanimous consent of 
the Council for a four-year renewable term. The Economic and Social 
Committee must be consulted in cases concerning the harmonization 
of provisions that entail amending national legislation, such as tax 
legislation.81 
Community law is comprised of basic legislation, which includes the 
treaties and their protocols, and secondary legislation, which are the 
legislative products of the Community institutions. Community law 
either has a direct internal effect as law in the Member States or 
requires the Member States to implement the legislation domestically.82 
adopt the amended proposal by qualified majority if the Commission supports the 
amendments or the Council can adopt the amended proposal by unanimous decision 
if the Commission opposes the amendments. 
Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189b(2); KMPG, supra note 67, at 8, 12; see also Dr. Hans-
Joachim Glaesner, Formulation of Objectives and Decision-Making Procedure in the European Union, 
18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 765, 772-73 (1995). 
77 The TEU created a third legislative process, the co-decision procedure, as outlined in new 
article 189b of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189b, amended !Jy TEU, 
supra note 1, art. G(1). The co-decision procedure applies widely, in particular to the harmoni-
zation directives, although not with respect to indirect or direct tax harmonization. Id; see 
BERMANN, supra note 58, at 89-90. This new procedure essentially gives Parliament veto power 
over legislation in policy areas such as the environment, research and development, culture, 
education, vocational training, and youth. Id. For example, Parliament can end definitively the 
legislative process by rejecting the common position agreed to by the Council. Pierre Mathijsen, 
The Power of the Co-Decision of the European Parliament Introduced !Jy the Maastricht Treaty, 8 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L. F. 81,85-86 (1993). 
78 EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 4(2). 
79 The European Atomic Energy Community was also established by a treaty signed on March 
25, 1957. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Mar. 27, 
1957, art. 1,298 U.N.T.S. 169. This Community was charged with the development of a common 
structure for nuclear energy. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 
BACKGROUND NOTES 3 (1990). 
80 EU Enlargement: Council Agrees on Final Technical Amendments for Enlargement to 15, Euro-
pean Report, Feb. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File [hereinafter EU 
Enlargementl. See generally EC Institutions, supra note 61, § 3.3 (discussing qualified majority 
voting). 
81 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 100; see also BERMANN, supra note 58, at 83; FREESTONE & 
DAVIDSON, supra note 58, at 85-86; HARTLEY, supra note 58, at 36-37. 
82 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 5, 189; see also PRICE WATERHOUSE, EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES 17 (1987). 
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The principal types of secondary Community legislation are regula-
tions, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions.83 
Regulations have general application and are binding in their en-
tirety on all Member States without any further action by individual 
states.84 The Council, the European Parliament acting jointly with the 
Council, and the Commission promulgate regulations.85 In practice, 
most regulations are made by the Commission. Although the vast 
majority of the regulations relate to agriculture, there is a draft regu-
lation which sets out a proposed statute for a European company.86 
Directives are addressed only to Member States and do not directly 
amend national law; they create obligations on the governments of the 
Member States to take implementing action to incorporate their pro-
visions in nationallegislation.87 They are proposed by the Commission 
and adopted by the Council after consultation with the European 
Parliament.88 Directives are the legislative instruments most commonly 
used to harmonize the Member States' legislation.89 Nearly all of the 
steps taken to harmonize the tax laws to date have been achieved 
through the use of directives. 
Directives are binding upon the Member States as to the result to be 
achieved but leave the national authorities free to choose the form and 
methods of compliance.9o When a Member State does not implement 
the directive into national law, the question arises as to whether the 
directive has direct effect, i.e., effective without such enactment.91 The 
European Court of Justice has observed that "a Member State which 
83 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189. 
84Id. Article 189 expressly provides that regulations are directly applicable. Id. 
85 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189, amended by TED, supra note 1, art. G(I). Article 189 
adopts the same institutional framework, in accordance with the provisions of the EEC Treaty as 
amended, to directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. Id. 
86 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 1991 
OJ. (C 176) 1; PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 82, at 20; see infra note 328 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the regulation on the European Company Statute. 
87Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189. Directives can never be directly applicable. See 
BERMANN, supra note 58, at 180. A provision of Community law is considered directly applicable 
only if it need not be incorporated into domestic legislation before becoming an element of the 
national legal order. Id. But see infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
possible direct effect of a directive. 
88 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 100, amended by TED, supra note 1, art. G(21). 
89 PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 82, at 18. 
90 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189. 
91 According to the Van Gend en Loos case, a Community law rule has direct effect if it creates 
rights for private parties that Member State institutions are legally bound to enforce against the 
Member States themselves and possibly against other private persons. Case 26/62, Van Gend en 
Laos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1; see also BERMANN, supra note 
58, at 166, 181. 
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has not adopted the implementing measures required by [a] directive 
within the prescribed period may not plead, as against individuals, its 
own failure to perform the obligations which the directive entails."92 
The test is whether the provisions of the directive are unconditional 
and sufficiently precise to be relied upon in a conflict with an incom-
patible national provision.93 "It is necessary to examine, in every case, 
whether the nature, general scheme and wording of the provision in 
question are capable of having direct effects on the relations between 
Member States and individuals."94 
Decisions of the Council and the Commission are binding on the 
government, enterprise, or private individual to whom they are ad-
dressed and are usually concerned with a specific problem and relate 
to individual cases.95 Recommendations and opinions are issued by 
both the Commission and the Council with respect to specific subjects 
on which advice has been sought and are not legally binding.96 
The consultation procedure is the decision-making procedure that 
is still applicable to tax harmonization legislation.97 Under this proce-
dure, the Commission prepares a preliminary draft of the directive, 
sometimes based on a report prepared by independent experts.98 The 
preliminary draft is sent to the Member States' governments and often 
is shared with the appropriate EC professional organizations for com-
ment. The Commission then prepares and adopts a proposed directive 
that is submitted formally to the Council. The European Parliament 
considers the proposed directive and publishes its opinion that either 
accepts, rejects, or suggests amendments to the proposal,99 The Com-
mission may amend the proposed directive to incorporate any changes 
92 Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53 (holding that although 
Germany had not yet implemented the Sixth VAT Directive, the directive was directly effective). 
93 Becker, 1982 E.C.R. at 71; see also BERMANN, supra note 58, at 184. 
94 Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (holding that a directive on the 
freedom of movement of workers was directly effective because it was clear, unambiguous, and 
capable of judicial application). 
95 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189; see also NOEL, supra note 34, at 9. 
96 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189; see also PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 82, at 12. 
97 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 99. The SEA also amended article 99 to provide that the 
Council should adopt legislation harmonizing turnover taxes, excise duties, and other forms of 
indirect taxation to the extent necessary to ensure the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market by the end of 1992. [d. 
98 KPMG, supra note 67, app. 1. 
99 The Economic and Social Committee must also be consulted for any legislation deriving from 
article 100. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 100. See supra notes 76 and 77, respectively, for an 
explanation of the cooperation procedure and co-decision procedure, the procedures followed 
by the European Parliament for other types of legislation. 
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suggested by the opinions of either the European Parliament or the 
Economic and Social Committee. The Council then examines the 
proposed directive and, if approval is unanimous, it is adopted. lOo 
The SEA modified the EEC Treaty to allow for the adoption of many 
approximation or harmonization measures on the vote of a qualified 
majority of the Council. This procedure is applicable to the alteration 
or suspension of duties relating to common customs tariffs, legislation 
regarding the free movement of capital and services, and the harmoni-
zation of national standards. 101 In contrast, a unanimous vote is re-
quired for the harmonization of indirect and direct taxation.102 This 
unanimity requirement explains, in part, why progress in the direct 
taxation area has been so slow. 103 
D. Enforcement of European Community Tax Legislation 
The Commission must ensure that the Treaties and Community law 
are respected and applied. 104 When a Member State fails to fulfill an 
obligation under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission provides a 
description of the treaty violation to that Member State and requests 
an end to the violation.105 If the Member State fails to comply with the 
request, the Commission may refer the infringement to the European 
Court of Justice. 106 The Commission may also bring suit against a 
100 PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 82, at 18-19. This unanimity requirement applies both to 
provisions for the harmonization oflegislation concerning turnover taxes, excise, and other forms 
of indirect taxation under article 99, and to directives for the approximation of direct taxes under 
article 100. Id. at 5. 
101 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 100a, amended fly SEA, supra note 43, art. 18. 
102 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 99, 100a, para. 2. 
103 Risinger, supra note 4, at 2. The TEU states that an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 
will begin in 1996 to deal with matters which were left unresolved by the TEU. Westendrnp Stresses 
the Challenge of Enlargement and Transparency, Reuters Textline: Agence Europe, June 7, 1995 
available in LEXIS, World library, Allwld File. One source of difficulty is that under the TEU the 
unanimity rule has been retained for taxation, as well as other issues. The unanimous voting 
requirement will be addressed at the 1996 IGC. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INTERGOVERNMEN-
TAL CONFERENCE 1996: COMMISSION REpORT FOR THE REFLECTION GROUP 33 (May 1995). Ger-
many, the Commission, and several smaller Member States would like more European decisions 
to be made by majority vote. European Union: Veto Mania, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 48. The 
United Kingdom, however, has often used the veto as a weapon and has been unwilling to lose 
its veto power in the area of taxation. Id. 
104 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 155. 
105Id. art. 169; see also A.P. LIER ET AL., TAX AND LEGAL AsPECTS OF EC HARMONIZATION 18 
(A.P. Lier ed., 1993). 
106 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 169; see also EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 18, at 26. 
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Member State in the Court, when the Commission believes that the 
country has failed to enact or enforce EC directives.107 
The Court of Justice's rulings are binding on Member States. For 
example, in 1978 the Court delivered judgments requiring several 
Member States to revise tax policies that favored domestically pro-
duced spirits to the detriment of imported products.108 Thus, France 
and Italy may no longer tax cognac at a lower rate than gin, whiskey, 
and vodka, and Denmark was forced to raise its tax on aquavit. lOg 
The Maastricht Treaty strengthened the enforcement powers of the 
CourtYo For example, the Court of Justice may impose fines on any 
Member State that refuses to comply with a Court ruling that it has 
infringed Community law. lll 
The European Court of Justice is composed of fifteen judges, each 
appointed for a renewable six-year term, and is assisted by nine Advo-
cates General.ll2 The Court's duties are multi-faceted although its 
fundamental task is to "ensure that in the interpretation and applica-
tion of this Treaty the law is observed. "113 The Court has jurisdiction 
to examine the validity of all acts adopted by the Council and the 
Commission, including regulations, directives, and decisions. 1I4 Ap-
peals can be brought on the grounds of: lack of competence; misuse 
of powers; or infringement of an essential procedural requirement, the 
Treaty of Rome, or any rule oflaw relating to its application. ll5 
107Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 175. The Member States and other EC institutions may 
also bring an action before the Court, if the Councilor the Commission fails to fulfill its obligation 
under the Treaty. LIER, supra note 105, at 19. Article 169 does not make a distinction between 
the Treaty and a directive, therefore, the transposition of the result of a directive into national 
law is a treaty obligation. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 169, 189. 
108 PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 82, at 62-63. 
109Case 168/78, Commission v. France 1980 E.C.R. 347; Case 169/78 Commission v. Italy 1980 
E.C.R. 385; see also Case 323/87 Commission v. Italy 1989 E.C.R. 2275; Case 171/78 Commission 
v. Denmark 1980 E.C.R. 447; KPMG, supra note 67, app. 1. 
110 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 171. 
III EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPE ON THE MOVE 18 (1994) [hereinafter 
EUROPE ON THE MOVE]. 
112 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 165-67; see also EU: Court of justice-Nomination of New 
Members, Agence Europe, Jan. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File. 
113Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 164; see also KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN 
DOCUMENTATION, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAw 35 (1991) [hereinafter COMMUNITY LAW]. 
II4Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 173. The Court of Justice does not opine on the validity 
of recommendations or opinions because recommendations and opinions have no legally binding 
force. LIER, supra note 105, at 19. 
115 LIER, supra note 105, at 19. 
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To ensure the uniform interpretation of Community law, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice will render, at the request of any court or tribunal 
of a Member State, a legally binding preliminary ruling in a case where 
any question of Community law arises. ll6 These preliminary rulings 
concern such matters as the interpretation of provisions of the Treaties 
or of acts of the Community institutions and the examination of the 
validity of Community legal acts. The Court will not rule on the merits 
of the pending case but rather limits the judgment to the interpreta-
tion or validity of the relevant question of Community law. ll7 Other 
national courts can rely on these article 177 rulings as authoritative 
interpretations of Community law or may resubmit the question to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling in the hope that the Court of Justice 
departs from its previous decision. lls 
Although the Court'sjudgments in the direct tax area have been few 
in number, the implications of these decisions are far-reaching. It is 
clear that national income tax regimes must be exercised consistently 
with the Treaty provisions establishing the fundamental freedoms of 
the Community.ll9 The fundamental freedoms encompass a prohibi-
tion of discrimination on the grounds of nationality, specifically found 
in article 48 for the free movement of workers, article 52 for the 
freedom of establishment, article 59 for the freedom of provision of 
services, and article 73b for the free movement of capital,l20 Because 
tax law often distinguishes between resident and non-resident taxpay-
ers and between permanent establishments and subsidiaries, the appli-
cation of this non-discrimination principle may result in the incom-
patibility of national tax provisions with EC law. The Court of Justice 
has ruled that when such distinctions result in the unequal treatment 
116 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 177; see also COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 113, at 37. 
Il7LIER, supra note 105, at 20. 
118 STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAw, 157-58 (1993). As of October 31,1989, 
a new court, the Court of First Instance, resolves disputes between the EC and its employees as 
well as appeals against an EC institution concerning competition regulations. LIER, supra note 
105, at 10. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance was extended to most direct actions 
brought by natural or legal persons as of September I, 1993. Id. These decisions may be appealed 
to the Court of Justice on points of law. Id. 
119 See, e.g., Case 279/93 Finanzamt Koln v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 225, para. 21. The four 
freedoms are: the free movement of goods (arts. 9-37); the free movement of persons (arts. 
48-58); the free movement of services (arts. 59-66); and the free movement of capital (arts. 
67-73H). Treaty of Rome, supra note 7. 
120 Malcolm Gammie & Guy Brannan, EC Law Strikes at the UK Corporation Tax-The Death Knell 
of UK Imputation?, 8-9 INTERTAX 389, 395 (1995). 
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of individuals or companies from other Member States, the tax law 
must be struck down unless the Member State can JUStify a derogation. l2l 
Member States can justify a restriction on one of the fundamental 
freedoms with a legitimate general interest that cannot be assured by 
less restrictive measures.122 Belgium was able to justify a discriminatory 
provision in its tax law which allowed a deduction for insurance pre-
miums, but only if the policies were with insurance companies located 
in Belgium. Mr. Bachmann, a German national working and living in 
Belgium, had insurance contracts with German companies and sought 
to deduct the premiums he paid from his Belgium income.123 Although 
the tax provision infringed Mr. Bachmann's rights under article 48, the 
Court agreed that it would undermine the coherence of the Belgian 
tax system to allow a deduction when there was no satisfactory assur-
ance that Belgium would be able to tax the proceeds of his policies.124 
The coherence of the tax system justification has limits. For example, 
in the Wielockx case, the Court found Dutch tax rules, which deny the 
deductibility of private pension allowances for non-resident self-em-
ployed individuals, incompatible with article 52, the freedom of estab-
lishment.125 Because the Netherlands had agreed to forgo the taxation 
of the pension income in its tax treaty with Belgium, the Netherlands 
had compromised its argument that there was no less restrictive means 
of ensuring the coherence of its system. 126 The Court determined that 
coherence between the availability of a deduction and the taxability of 
121 See, e.g., Case 270/83 Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273 (holding that failure of French 
law to extend a tax credit granted to French companies for French-source dividends to the 
permanent establishments of foreign companies, constituted a restriction on their freedom of 
establishment); Case 330/91 The Queen v. ex parte Commerzbank 1993 E.C.R. 4017 (holding 
that a United Kingdom law prohibiting non-resident companies from obtaining interest on tax 
repayments, was incompatible with articles 52 and 58 of the EC Treaty); Case 279/93 Finanzamt 
Koln v. Schumacker 1995 E.C.R. 225 (holding that a German law denying non-resident taxpayers 
special tax deductions allowed residents for family circumstances, was incompatible with article 
48 when the non-resident worker receives almost all his income from that Member State); see 
also Michel de Wolf, The Power of Taxation in the European Union and in the United States, 13 EC 
TAX REv. 124, 127-28 (1995). 
122 Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, Restrictions on the Fundamental Freedoms Enshrined in the EC Treaty 
lty Discriminatory Tax Provisions-Ban and Justification, 3 EC TAX REv. 74, 78 (1994). 
1231d. at 79. 
124 See Case 204/90 Bachmann v. Etat Beige, 1992 E.C.R. 249; see also Gammie & Brannan, supra 
note 120, at 395-96. 
125 Case 80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R. 876; see Kees Van Raad, EC 
Court of Justice Decides Wielockx Case, Restricting the Scope of Bachmann Decision, 11 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 779, 780 (Sept. 18, 1995). 
126 Gammie & Brannan, supra note 120, at 395. 
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the corresponding income, must take applicable tax treaties into con-
sideration. I27 
Finally, one must always keep in mind that the Treaty of Rome rules 
on free movement are designed to protect Community nationals in 
their efforts to engage in genuine cross-border economic activities. I28 
The Court of Justice confirmed this in Factortame IIwith regard to the 
freedom of establishment: "The concept of establishment within the 
meaning of article 52 of the Treaty involves the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member 
State for an indefinite period."129 Therefore, the Treaty's provisions on 
free movement cannot be relied upon where the transaction is pre-
dominantly motivated by tax considerations. I3o 
E. Taxation in the Community 
The unanimity requirement for tax legislation helps explain why 
progress towards tax harmonization has been so slow. But it is also 
important to recognize that the Member States have extremely wide 
variations not only in their tax rates but also in their basic approach 
to taxation. The following tables illustrate the structure of taxation in 
the EEC countries. 
Table 1 contains information on the sources of tax revenue as a 
percentage of total tax revenue in each of the twelve Member States 
in 1992. The last entry represents an unweighted average that has been 
computed for the EEC. The sources of the revenue are divided into 
six categories: corporate income, personal income, social security, prop-
erty, consumption, and other taxes. 
All of the EEC member countries derived over seventy-five percent 
of their tax revenues from personal income taxes, social security taxes, 
and consumption taxes in 1992. With the exceptions of Luxembourg 
and Italy, corporate taxes play a very minor revenue-raising role. 
127Van Raad, supra note 125, at 780. 
128 Jan Wouters, The Case-Law of the European Court of Justice on Direct Taxes: Variations Upon 
a Theme, 1 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMPo LAW 179,183 (1994). 
129 Case 221/89 The Queen v. The Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Limited 
and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 3905, para. 20. 
130 Wouters, supra note 128, at 184. For example, in the Daily Mail case, the company tried to 
transfer its central management and control from the United Kingdom to the Netherlands in 
order to avoid capital gains tax. The Court would not interpret articles 52 and 58 as conferring 
a right to transfer central management and control to another Member State. Case 81/87 The 
Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners ofInternal Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General 
Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, para. 23-24. 
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Table 1. Sources of Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Total Tax Revenue. 
1992 
Corporate Personal Social Property Consumption Other 
Income Income Security Taxes Taxes Taxes 
Belgium 4.5 31.2 36.0 2.5 25.5 
Denmark 3.3 53.6 3.1 4.0 32.5 0.2 
France 3.5 13.8 44.6 5.0 26.8 4.2 
Germany 4.0 28.0 38.4 2.7 26.9 
Greece 4.6 10.2 30.7 4.4 46.1 0.1 
Ireland 6.8 32.0 15.3 4.4 40.2 
Italy 11.6 27.2 31.3 2.4 26.9 
Luxembourg 13.1 22.2 28.4 7.9 28.4 
Netherlands 6.6 24.8 38.8 3.6 25.8 0.5 
Portugal 8.1 20.4 25.4 2.3 43.0 0.4 
Spain 6.4 23.6 36.6 4.7 28.5 0.1 
D.K. 7.6 28.4 17.8 7.9 34.4 3.7 
EEC 6.7 26.3 28.9 4.3 32.1 0.8 
Source: Based on Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1993 Tables 7, 11, and 
13. Paris, 1994 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom appear to rely most 
heavily on direct taxes131 (corporate income, personal income, and 
social security taxes) as the predominant source of revenue, whereas 
Greece and Portugal rely predominantly on indirect taxes such as 
property and consumption taxes. 132 Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Spain raise over one third of their tax revenue from 
social security taxes. 
Table 2 contains data on total tax revenues as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) for each of the twelve Member States and the 
EEC as a whole. Table 3 illustrates the source of these revenues as a 
percentage ofGDP for 1992. Tax revenues as a percentage ofGDP, also 
known as the tax ratio, measures the size of the tax burden in each 
country relative to the value of goods and services produced within its 
physical boundaries. In 1992, the tax ratios ranged from a high of 
49.3% in Denmark to a low of 33.0% in Portugal, over a 16 percentage 
131 Direct taxes include the OECD categories of Income and Profits (1000), Social Security 
(2000), and Payroll (3000) taxes which correspond to corporate income, personal income, and 
social security taxes in Table 1. This classification is in accordance with the System of National 
Accounts, United Nations, 1968. See OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS OF THE OECD MEMBER STATES 
1965-199441 (1995 ed.). 
132 Indirect taxes include the OECD categories of Property (4000) and Goods and Services 
(5000), taxes which correspond to property and consumption taxes in Table 1. This classification 
is in accordance with the System of National Accounts, United Nations, 1968. See id. 
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Table 2. Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
1965 1986 1992 
Belgium 31.2 47.2 45.4 
Denmark 29.9 50.8 49.3 
France 34.5 44.0 43.6 
Germany** 31.6 37.7 39.6 
Greece 22.0 36.9 40.5 
Ireland 25.9 37.2 36.6 
Italy 25.5 36.0 42.4 
Luxembourg 30.6 48.1 48.4 
Netherlands 32.5 44.9 46.9 
Portugal 18.4 29.4 33.0 
Spain 14.7 30.6 35.8 
U.K. 30.4 37.6 35.2 
EEC 27.3 40.0 41.4 
131 
1993* 
45.7 
50.0 
44.0 
39.7 
37.1 
43.2 
48.2 
31.1 
34.7 
34.4 
Source: Based on Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1993, Table 3. Paris, 1994. 
* Table 112, Estimates of revenues as percentage ofGDP (to the extent available). 
** Germany's numbers are unified as of 1991. 
point spread. The common denominator, however, is that the residents 
of EEC countries are very heavily taxed. In comparison, U.S. federal 
tax revenues equaled 29.4% of GDP in 1992. 
The trend since 1965 has, for the most part, been increased taxation. 
Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP have increased over fifteen 
percentage points in countries like Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and Spain. However, since 1986, with the exceptions of Italy, 
Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain, tax ratios are either 
leveling off or slightly declining and the spread is narrowing. In 1986, 
the tax ratios ranged from a high of 50.8% in Denmark to a low of 
30.6% in Spain, over a 20 percentage point spread. By 1992, Denmark 
still had the highest tax ratio, 49.3%, and Portugal had the lowest tax 
ratio, 33.0%, narrowing the spread between the EEC countries to 16.3 
percentage points. Within the EEC, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands would be con-
sidered high-tax countries (tax ratios approximately 40% and above) 
and Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom would be con-
sidered low-tax countries. 
As pointed out in the public finance literature, the reasons for the 
varying high levels of taxation can be traced to the different levels of 
acceptance of a larger role for the public sector in each of the EEC 
countries.!33 There has also been an increased demand for income 
133 See, e.g., Richard Goode, The Tax Burden in the United States and Other Countries, in 
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
132 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIX, No. 1 
Table 3. Sources of Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product. 
1992 
Corporate Personal Social Property Consumption Other 
Income Income Security Taxes Taxes Taxes 
Belgium 2.0 14.2 16.3 1.1 11.6 
Denmark 1.6 26.4 1.5 2.0 16.0 0.1 
France 1.5 6.0 19.4 2.2 11.7 1.8 
Germany* 1.6 11.1 15.2 1.1 10.7 
Greece 1.9 4.1 12.4 1.8 18.7 
Ireland 2.5 11.7 5.6 1.6 14.7 
Italy 4.9 11.5 13.3 1.0 11.4 
Luxembourg 6.3 10.7 13.7 3.8 13.7 
Netherlands 3.1 11.6 18.2 1.7 12.1 0.2 
Portugal 2.7 6.7 8.4 .8 14.2 0.1 
Spain 2.3 8.4 13.1 1.7 10.2 
U.K 2.7 10.0 6.3 2.8 12.1 1.3 
EEC 2.8 10.9 12.0 1.8 13.3 0.3 
Source: Based on Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1993 Tables 3,7, 11, and 
13. Paris, 1994 * Germany's numbers are unified as of 1991. 
redistribution through the budget leading to increased public outlays 
of varying degrees for transfer programs for the unemployed, elderly, 
sick, etc. 134 
Table 4 illustrates this income redistribution theory. Much of the 
growth in tax revenues has been from increased taxes on income and 
profits, particularly for the period between 1965 and 1988.135 This 
source of revenue is generally perceived to be more progressive than 
taxes on goods and services. 136 With the exception of the United King-
dom, every EEC country's taxes on income and profits grew by at least 
two percentage points, with Denmark growing by a phenomenal 15.7 
percentage points since 1965. Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Portu-
gal, and Spain also saw significant growth in taxes on goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP. Only in Greece, Luxembourg, and 
SCIENCE 89 (1968); K.C. MESSERE, TAX POLICY IN OECD COUNTRIES: CHOICES AND CONFLICTS 
52, 119 (1993); ALAN T. PEACOCK AND JACK WISEMAN, THE GROWTH OF THE PUBLIC EXPENDI-
TURES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 26-27 (1961). See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL 
SYSTEMS (1969); THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD (Vito Tanzi 
ed.,1982). 
134Sijbren Cnossen, Tax Structure Developments, in TAX COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 19,22 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 1987). 
135 Most of the increase took place between 1965 and 1975. See MESS ERE, supra note 133, at 
82-83. 
136 See id. at 145, 394. 
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Table 4. Selected Taxes as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
Taxes on Income and Profits* Taxes on Goods and Services** 
1965 1988 1992 1965 1988 1992 
Belgium 8.6 17.9 16.3 11.6 1l.5 11.6 
Denmark 13.7 30.2 29.4 12.1 17.5 16.0 
France 5.5 7.6 7.6 13.2 12.9 11.7 
Germany 10.7 12.9 12.7 10.4 9.5 10.6 
Greece 2.0 6.3 7.4 10.7 16.0 18.7 
Ireland 6.7 15.1 14.2 13.7 16.4 14.7 
Italy 4.5 13.1 16.6 10.1 10.3 11.4 
Luxembourg 11.0 20.0 17.1 7.6 12.0 13.7 
Netherlands 1l.6 13.3 14.7 9.3 12.3 12.1 
Portugal 4.5 6.7 9.5 8.1 14.5 14.2 
Spain 3.6 9.2 10.8 6.0 10.1 10.2 
U.K 11.3 13.9 12.7 10.0 11.6 12.1 
EEC 7.8 13.8 14.1 10.2 12.9 13.1 
Source: Based on Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1993, Tables 8 and 24, 
Paris, 1994. * Taxes on Income and Profits covers taxes levied on the net income or profits of 
individuals and enterprises. ** Taxes on Goods and Services include all taxes and duties levied 
on the production, extraction, sale, transfer or delivery of goods, and the rendering of services 
such as multi-stage cumulative taxes, general sales taxes, VATs, and excise taxes. 
Portugal did the percentage point increases in taxes on goods and 
services exceed that of taxes on income and profits. 
As illustrated by Tables 1 and 4, the distribution of the tax burden 
between direct and indirect taxes differs greatly from one country to 
another. The disparity between the highest direct tax ratio, Denmark 
at 29.4%, and the lowest, Greece at 7.4%, has broadened greatly since 
1965 (22.0 percentage points versus 11.7 percentage points). This 
phenomenon is not as significant in the case of indirect taxation. In 
1992, Greece had the highest indirect tax ratio at 18.7% and Spain the 
lowest ratio at 10.2%. This is comparable to Ireland's indirect tax ratio 
of 13.7% and Spain's at 6.0% in 1965. Thus, while the gap has widened, 
there has not been a significant increase in the disparity. This diversity 
in tax structures among the Member States partly explains the slow 
progress being made in the area of tax harmonization. 
II. DIRECT TAXATION 
A. The Directives and the Arbitration Convention 
The scope of EC direct tax legislation is much more limited than 
indirect tax legislation. As discussed previously, the legal basis for 
proposals on direct taxes is confined to those having a direct impact 
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on the functioning of the common market.137 The goal is to "ensure 
that firms operating across frontiers are not subject to less favorable 
tax conditions than those applicable to their activities in the Member 
State in which they are established. "138 
Until 1990, no substantive progress had been made in the area of 
direct tax harmonization. Previously, in 1975, the Commission had 
proposed a draft directive on the harmonization of corporate and 
individual income taxes and withholding taxes on dividends.139 It called 
for the adoption of an imputation system with a single corporate tax 
rate to range between forty-five and fifty-five percent, an income 
tax credit on dividends, and uniform dividend withholding rates of 
twenty-five percent. 140 Too ambitious an undertaking, this draft lan-
guished. Harmonization of corporate tax rates and the tax treatment 
of dividends seemed senseless in light of the extreme differences that 
existed in the calculation of taxable corporate income. l41 
The Commission withdrew the draft directive of 1975 and concen-
trated on those measures deemed essential by the White Paper for 
Completing the Internal Market by December, 199V42 The Commis-
sion made progress after years of stagnation when the Council reached 
agreement in July 1990 on three corporate tax proposals:l43 (1) a 
common system of taxation applicable to parent companies and their 
subsidiaries in different Member States ("Parent-Subsidiary Directive") ;144 
(2) a common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, 
transfers of assets, and exchange of shares involving companies from 
different Member States ("Mergers Directive");145 and (3) a transfer-
price arbitration procedure ("Arbitration Convention").146 
137Treaty of Rome, sUfrra note 7, art. 100; Taxation in the Single Market, sUfrra note 41, at 25. 
138 Christiane Scrivener, Address to the Members of the European Commission, Paris, (Feb. 
1990), reprinted in Taxation in the Single Market, sUfrra note 41, at 25. 
139 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the Harmonization of Company 
Taxation and of Withholding Taxes on Dividends, 1975 OJ. (C 253). 
140 See infra note 151 for an explanation of imputation systems. 
141 Cnossen, sUfrra note 134, at 39. 
142 See GUIDELINES ON COMPANY TAXATION, sUfrra note 5, at 10. See sufrra notes 43-45 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the White Paper. 
143 Roger H.A. Muray, European Direct Tax Harmonization-Progress in 1990, EUR. TAX'N 74, 85 
(Mar. 1991). 
144 Council Directive 90/435 of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to 
Parent Companies and their Subsidiaries in Different Member States, 1990 OJ. (L 225) 6 
[hereinafter Parent-Subsidiary Directive]. 
145 Council Directive 90/434 of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to 
Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanging Shares Concerning Companies of Differ-
ent Member States, 1990 OJ. (L 225) 1 [hereinafter Mergers Directive]. 
146 Convention 90/436 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjust-
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1. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive evolved from a Commission pro-
posal submitted to the Council in 1969.147 It provided that a Member 
State should not impose a withholding tax on dividends paid to a 
parent company by a subsidiary owned twenty-five percent or more by 
the parent. 148 The implementing legislation must either exempt the 
dividends from corporate tax or allow a credit for any tax paid by the 
subsidiary on the profits from which the dividend is paid.149 Thus, this 
Directive will go some distance toward guaranteeing the neutrality of 
the tax law with respect to investment decisions. 15o 
In most cases, there will be no double taxation when a company 
decides to set up a subsidiary in another Member State. The Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, however, does not extend across borders the 
benefit of the imputation systems that integrate corporate and share-
holder taxation in several Member States. lSI As the corporate tax im-
puted to shareholders as a credit against their personal income tax 
liability can be denied to foreign shareholders, the effect of the Direc-
tive is to allow the source country to collect a single, full level of 
ments of Transfers of Profits Between Associated Undertakings, 1990 OJ. (L 225) 19 [hereinafter 
Arbitration Convention]. 
147 Taxation in the Single Market, supra note 41, at 25. 
148 Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 5. Imputation taxes such as the precompte 
in France, imposta di congualio in Italy, equalization tax (Ausschuttungsbelastung) in Germany, 
and advance corporation tax (ACT) in Ireland and the United Kingdom are still allowed. Ruding 
Report, supra note 2, at 54. These taxes ensure that all dividends paid out for which there is a 
shareholder tax credit have actually been subject to domestic corporate tax. ld; see Parent-Sub-
sidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 7. 
149 Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 4. The Directive is limited in its application 
to a company that takes one of the legal forms listed in the Annex to the Directive, is resident 
for tax purposes in a Member State, and is subject to one of the corporate taxes listed in article 
2. ld. art. 2; see infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text for discussion of expansion of the scope 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Member States have the option of not applying the Directive 
to companies which do not maintain their holdings in the subsidiary for a continuous period of 
at least two years. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 3. 
150 Muray, supra note 143, at 75; see also Taxation in the Single Market, supra note 41, at 26. 
151 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 195-96. Luxembourg and the Netherlands operate classical 
corporate tax systems under which corporate profits distributed as dividends are fully taxable at 
the corporate level and again at the shareholder level. ld. at 194. The other Member States 
provide relief for this double taxation at either the corporate level, the shareholder level, or both 
levels. ld. Germany levies a lower tax rate on dividend distributions and Greece allows a partial 
or full deduction for dividend payments. ld. Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, and the UK provide 
shareholder relief by granting imputation credits with France, Germany, and Italy providing a 
full credit for corporate taxes actually paid. Belgium, Denmark, and Portugal levy reduced 
personal tax rates on dividend receipts. ld.; see infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text for 
Ruding Committee recommendations. 
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tax from the distributing subsidiary.152 Therefore, in many situations, 
cross-border tax structures will remain biased.153 
The Directive required implementing legislation to be effective by 
January 1, 1992, although Germany, Greece, and Portugal were given 
extensions with respect to the zero withholding tax requirement. 154 
Every Member State has implemented the Directive, although Italy met 
this deadline only by a legislative decree on March 5, 1993 retroactive 
to profits distributed on or after January 1, 1992.155 The legislation 
adopted by Italy is typical and relies on the exemption method156 so 
that ninety-five percent of the profits distributed by EC subsidiaries 
are not included in the taxable income of the Italian parent. 157 To 
qualify for this tax treatment: (1) the parent must have held a mini-
mum of twenty-five percent of the subsidiary'S capital for at least a 
continuous year when the distribution is made; (2) the subsidiary must 
152 Risinger, supra note 4, at 2l. Germany integrates corporate and shareholder taxation by 
means of a combination of imputation credit and split rate (the use of a lower corporate rate for 
distributed profits than for retained earnings). Id. Because of the nondiscrimination clause of 
Germany's tax treaties, the benefit of the split rate cannot be denied to foreign shareholders. Id. 
As zero rate withholding effectively forces Germany to extend the benefit of the split rate to 
foreign parent companies, Germany may continue to exact a five percent withholding tax until 
mid-1996, provided it continues to grant a rate reduction for distributed profits of at least eleven 
percentage points. Id. at 20. 
153 Muray, supra note 143, at 78. 
154 Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 8. Germany may withhold 5% on dividends 
until July 1, 1996 as long as the corporate income tax rate on retained earnings exceeds the rate 
on distributed profits by 11 %. Id. art. 5, para. 3. Greece may withhold on dividends distributed 
to parent companies in other Member States until it implements a corporate tax on distributed 
profits. Id. art. 5, para. 2. Note, Greece abolished dividend withholding tax for years after June 
30, 1992. Cussons, supra note 23, at 108. Portugal may withhold 15% on dividends until 1997 
and 10% until 2000. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 5, para. 4. 
155 Simona Bellenttini, Parent-Subsidiary Finds Home in Italy, 4 INT'L TAX REv. 36 (Apr. 1993). 
As for the newest EC members, Sweden, Finland, and Austria have all implemented the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. Leif Muten, Sweden Begins Implementation of the EU Merger and Parent-Sub-
sidiary Directive, 10 TAX NOTES INT'L 637 (Feb. 10, 1995); World Summary-Finland International 
Tax Report, Eurostudy Publishing Co. Ltd.,Jan. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld 
File; Otman Thommes, Austria Well Ahead of the Other Three New Member States, 1 INTERTAX 54 
Gan.1995). 
156 The UK, Ireland, and Greece adopted the credit method. Frans Vanistendael, The Implemen-
tation of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive in the EC--Comments on Some Unresolved QJtestions, 92 
TAX NOTES INT'L 599,600 (1992). Germany has also adopted the credit method. Augusto Fantozzi 
& Andrea Manganelli, Parent-Subsidiary Directive Changes EC Corporate operations, 4 J. INT'L 
TAX'N 349, 351 (1993). However, German tax treaties with other Member States exempt dividends 
received by a German company from certain treaty partner resident companies. Id. 
157The Parent-Subsidiary Directive permits a Member State to disallow expenses relating to the 
subsidiary holding not to exceed five percent of the profits distributed by the subsidiary if 
expenses are fixed at a flat rate. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 4, para. 2. Thus, 
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be a resident in an EC Member State and incorporated under one of 
the legal forms listed in the appendix of the Directive; and (3) the 
subsidiary must be subject to corporate income tax in its state of 
residence. 15s 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive allows for the adoption of an anti-
avoidance regime.159 Some commentators are concerned that the lack 
of harmonization with respect to the anti-avoidance rules may thwart 
the Directive.16°The French legislation, for example, denies the benefit 
of the exemption from withholding taxes when dividends are paid to 
entities directly or indirectly controlled by one or several residents of 
non-EC Member States. 161 
2. The Mergers Directive 
The Mergers Directive also originated from a 1969 proposal.162 The 
Mergers Directive seeks to remove barriers to the free and unimpeded 
flow of capital by, under some conditions, deferring or eliminating 
gains at the corporate level in mergers, divisions, transfers of assets, or 
exchanges of sharesl63 involving corporations from multiple EC coun-
tries.164 This Directive was to facilitate the restructuring deemed neces-
the maintenance of a tax charge on five percent of the profits complies with the Directive. 
Bellenttini, supra note 155, at 36. 
158 Bellenttini, supra note 155, at 36. 
159 Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 144, art. 1, para. 2. 
160 Augusto Fantozzi & Andrea Manganelli, Italy, 1 EC TAX REv. 32, 38 (1993) (noting that 
differences in the effectiveness of the anti-avoidance rules in a particular jurisdiction are likely 
to distort competition and decisions on the location of investment). 
161 Gilbert Tixier & Dominique Berlin, France, 1 EC TAX REv. 24, 25 (1993). 
162 Taxation in the Single Market, supra note 41, at 26. 
163 Mergers Directive, supra note 145, art. 2. Article 2(a) defines "merger" as a combination of 
two or more existing companies into an existing company or a new company (including a parent) 
in which the shareholders of the merged companies receive securities of the surviving or new 
company and cash, if any, not exceeding 10% of the nominal value or accounting par value of 
those securities. A "division" is defined in article 2(a) as a transfer by an existing company of all 
its assets and liabilities to two or more existing or new companies in exchange for the issuance 
of securities to the transferor's shareholders. A "transfer of assets" is defined in article 2(c) as a 
transfer of one or more branches by one company to another company in exchange for securities 
to the transferee. An "exchange of shares" is defined in article 2(d) as a holding in the capital 
of another company such that it obtains a majority of the voting rights in that company in 
exchange for the issue to the shareholders of the latter company, in exchange for their securities, 
of securities representing the capital of the former company, and, if applicable, a cash payment 
not exceeding 10% of the nominal value of the accounting par value of the securities issued in 
exchange. Id.; see also Aland, supra note 44, at 1075 n.29. 
164John F. Chown, The Mergers Directive-Some Broader Issues, 10 INTERTAX 409, 410 (1990); 
see Mergers Directive, supra note 145, art. 4. 
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sary to compete in the internal market. Without the Directive, a cross-
border merger could cause the recapture of depreciation, the taxation 
of capital gains on appreciated property, and the disappearance of 
carryforward losses.165 
Pursuant to the Directive, the resulting corporation inherits the tax 
history of the assets and any carryover losses from the former com-
pany.166 The Mergers Directive also provides for deferral of tax conse-
quences until the sale of the assets to a third party.167 The Mergers 
Directive rules are roughly comparable to the U.S. tax rules governing 
tax-free reorganizations.168 
Unfortunately, many of the cross-border transactions contemplated 
by the Directive cannot yet be legally implemented because progress 
in the tax field has actually outpaced developments in the company 
law area.169 The Mergers Directive must be supplemented by commer-
ciallaw changes required by the proposed Tenth Company Law Direc-
tive before cross-border mergers and divisions are permitted under 
some domestic company laws.17o For example, laws presently exist in 
Belgium and the United Kingdom permitting mergers but only be-
tween domestic entities. Cross-border mergers and divisions as set 
forth by the Directive are not legally possible or recognized in these 
coun tries. l7l 
In contrast, cross-border transfers of assets and exchanges of shares, 
also within the scope of the Directive, generally are already possible in 
all Member States except for Greece.172 All EC countries except for 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom have imple-
mented the Mergers Directive.173 Belgium, Germany, and the United 
165 See Mergers Directive, supra note 145, art. 4, art. 6. 
166Id. art 4., para. 2, art. 6. 
167Id. art. 4. 
168 Aland, supra note 44, at 1075; see I.R.C. § 368 (CCH 1995). 
169 Muray, supra note 143, at 77. 
170 Helmut Becker, Europe 92 and Taxation, 10 INTERTAX 408, 408 (Oct. 1990); see Proposal for 
a Tenth Council Directive based on article 54(3) (g) of the Treaty Concerning Cross-Border 
Mergers of Public Limited Companies, 1985 OJ. (C 23) 11 [hereinafter Tenth Company Law 
Directive]. This Directive would enable cross-border legal mergers and divisions to the extent not 
already provided for under current domestic law. Cussons, supra note 23, at 111. 
171 Consolidated Commentary on the Present Status of Implementation of the Tax Directive on 
Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares in all Member States of the European 
Union, EC TAX NOTES (Supp.), Oct. 1993-Apr. 1994, at 10 [hereinafter Consolidated Commen-
tary]. 
172 Muray, supra note 143, at 78-79; see infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text for discussion 
of proposed amendments to the Mergers Directive. 
173 Consolidated Commentary, supra note 171, at 4-22. As for the newest EC members, Sweden 
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Kingdom have taken the position that their legislation already con-
forms with the Directive because the Directive is only relevant for the 
exchange of shares and the transfer of assets.174 Greece is the furthest 
from implementing the Mergers Directive because it has no tax or 
company laws governing cross-border transactions as set forth by the 
Directive.175 The specific provisions in each country's tax laws vary as 
to the conditions for the tax-free or tax-deferred treatment of the 
transactions (mergers, divisions, transfers of assets, or exchanges of 
shares). 
3. The Arbitration Convention 
The final measure adopted by the Council was an arbitration proce-
dure designed to eliminate the double taxation resulting from adjust-
ments made by one tax authority that are not accompanied by a 
corresponding adjustment by the other Member State's tax authority, 
for example, in the area of transfer pricing.176 The Community has 
realized that optional provisions of bilateral agreements are insufficient 
to prevent such double taxation.177 
The Arbitration Convention establishes a mandatory arbitration pro-
cedure upon failure by the competent authorities to reach an agree-
ment,178 and sets forth a specific timetable for the resolution of the 
matter. If the competent authorities fail to reach agreement within two 
years, the case is referred to an advisory commission for arbitration. 179 
This commission then has six months to deliver its opinion which the 
has implemented the Directive. See Bertil Wimar, The Implementation of EC Tax Measures in 
Swedish Law, 3 EC TAX REv. 151, 154-58 (1995). Austria has granted deferred tax relief to 
cross-border transactions involving an Austrian transferring company. Both Austria and the 
receiving company's country company law must recognize the transaction as a legal merger. Leif 
Muten, Sweden Begins Implementation of EU Merger and Parent-Subsidiary Directives, 10 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 637 (Feb. 10, 1995); Otmar Thommes, Austria Well Ahead of the Other Three New Member 
States, 1 INTERTAX 54 Gan. 1995). 
174LIER, supra note 105, at 185. 
175 Consolidated Commentary, supra note 171, at 10. 
176Unlike the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Mergers Directive, the Arbitration Conven-
tion is actually a multilateral treaty. LIER, supra note 105, at 159. Article 220 authorizes Member 
States to enter into negotiations in order to avoid double taxation. Treaty of Rome, supra note 
7, art. 220. 
177 Taxation in the Single Market, supra note 41, at 27. 
178Income tax treaties usually provide for a dispute resolution mechanism where taxpayers 
initially bring claims of improper treatment under a tax treaty to a representative of their own 
government, known as the "competent authority." MICHAEL McINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL 
INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED STATES 2-71 (2d ed. 1992). 
179 Arbitration Convention, supra note 146, art. 7, para. 1. 
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competent authorities must implement within the next six months. 180 
Ratified by the legislature of each Member State,181 this Convention 
entered into force on January 1,1995, the first day of the third month 
following the deposit of the last ratification instrument.182 
4. Proposed Directives 
Also during 1990, the Commission proposed two directives with 
respect to cross-border loss relief183 and the elimination of withholding 
taxes on inter-company royalties and interest payments.184 The Loss 
Directive is applicable to companies with loss-generating permanent 
establishments or subsidiaries in another EC country. Under the pro-
posal, each Member State would choose one of two methods of relief. 
The first method, the credit method, allows aggregation of the profits 
and losses of all of the permanent establishments of the company with 
a credit for the foreign taxes paid on the profits of the permanent 
establishments. 185 
The second method, the re-incorporation method, provides a de-
duction for foreign tax losses from the profits taxable by the home 
country and re-incorporation of foreign tax profits to the extent of 
the losses previously allowed. The re-incorporation method must be 
chosen for losses of a subsidiary.186 In March 1992, the European 
Parliament issued its opinion on the Loss Directive.187 The proposal for 
ISO Id. art. 11; see also Muray, supra note 143, at 76. 
lSI Patrick L. Kelly, EU Arbitration Convention Ratified by all Member States, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 
152-56 (1994). As of June 1995, the three newest EC members, Austria, Sweden, and Finland 
have not yet ratified the Arbitration Convention. Jan-Willem Gerritsen, Report on Baker & 
Mckenzie 1995 European Tax Conference, 10 TAX NOTES INT'L 1938 (1995). 
IS2EuROPEAN FILE, TAX LAw AND CRoss-BoRDER COOPERATION BETWEEN COMPANIES 6 (1991) 
[hereinafter EUROPEAN FILE]. Portugal deposited its instrument of ratification on October 20, 
1994. John Turro, EU Arbitration Convention to Enter Into Force January 1, 1995, 9 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 1602 (1994). The Convention will initially be effective for five years. Kelly, supra note 181, 
at 153. The signatory countries will meet again prior to the conclusion of the five-year time 
period to decide upon an extension or any other modifications. Id. 
IS3Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Arrangements for the Taking into Account by 
Enterprises of the Losses of their Permanent Establishments and Subsidiaries Situated in Other 
Member States, 1991 OJ. (C 53) 30 [hereinafter Loss Directive]. 
IS4 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to Interest 
and Royalty Payments Made Between Parent Companies and Subsidiaries in Different Member 
States, 1991 OJ. (C 53) 26 [hereinafter Interest and Royalty Directive]. 
ISS Loss Directive, supra note 183, arts. 6-7; see also Direct Tax, supra note 39, § 3.6. 
IS6 See Loss Directive, supra note 183, art. 9. 
IS7Direct Tax, supra note 39, § 3.6. 
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this directive is under consideration by the Council but negotiations 
are progressing very slowly. 188 
Similar to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the proposal regarding 
the limitation of the withholding tax on interest and royalties paid 
between affiliated EC companies required that Member States exempt 
cross-border interest and royalty payments made between parents and 
subsidiaries from withholding taxes. 189 Although the EC finance minis-
ters began discussions in 1991, they were unable to adopt this Direc-
tive. 190 On November 30, 1994, the Commission formally withdrew the 
proposed Interest and Royalty Directive. 191 The Commissioner will con-
sult with interested parties and present a new proposal in the near 
future. 192 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive's most immediate effect is an ap-
preciable reduction in the cross-border tax burdens of the affected 
companies. The Mergers Directive is already effective for transfers of 
assets and exchanges of shares, but must wait for Community company 
law action with respect to mergers and divisions. The European Parlia-
ment has not yet opined on the Commission's proposal on cross-bor-
der mergers of public limited companies (Tenth Company Law Direc-
tive), and the Council is still examining the modified proposal for a 
regulation for a European Company Statute.193 Finally, unlike double 
taxation conventions, the Arbitration Convention involves the affected 
company in the proceedings at an early stage, which should result in 
significant savings realized from the time restrictions. 194 
Besides the establishment of substantive rules, these directives and 
the proposed directives have and will continue to have an important 
188Id. 
189Interest and Royalty Directive, supra note 184, art. 4. In March 1991 and February 1992, 
both the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament respectively adopted 
favorable opinions on this proposal. Direct Tax, supra note 39, § 3.5. Pursuant to the recommen-
dations of the Parliament, the Commission amended the proposed directive expanding the 
definition of included interest and royalty payments. Amended Interest and Royalty Directive, 
1993 OJ. (C 178) 15. 
190Nigel Tutt, EC Finance Ministers Discuss Easing Withholding Tax on Interest, TAX ANALYSTS' 
DAILY TAX HIGHLIGHTS AND Docs., Apr. 9, 1991, at 303; see also Richard G. Minor, Euromoney 
Conference Focuses on EC Tax Policy, Eastern Europe, and Transfer Pricing, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 1548 
(1993). 
191 Commission Withdraws Its Proposal on Company Tax, Transport Europe, Dec. 20, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File. 
192Id. 
193 EUROPEAN FILE, supra note 182, at 15; see Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The 
Evolving European Corporation Statute, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 695, 772 (1993). 
194 EUROPEAN FILE, supra note 182, at 16. 
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indirect influence on the interpretation of treaties. 195 Most tax treaties 
follow article 3(2) of the OECD Model Treaty196 and require the use 
of a nation's domestic law to interpret an undefined term.197 The 
directives, once enacted, become part of the domestic law of the EC 
Member State, and any definition found in them will also apply for 
treaty interpretation.198 
B. The Ruding Committee Report 
Progress in the direct taxation area has come about because the 
Commission adopted a flexible approach. Convergence, approxima-
tion, and cooperation rather than harmonization are encouraged.199 
In keeping with this new approach, in December, 1990, Commissioner 
Scrivener established a committee of independent experts chaired by 
Mr. Onno Ruding, a former Dutch Finance Minister, to identify future 
proposals on company taxation after 1992.200 The Committee's man-
date was to evaluate the need for greater harmonization of business 
taxation.201 The Committee considered the following questions: (1) 
whether the differences in corporate taxation among the Member 
States create distortions with respect to investment decisions and com-
petition in the single market; (2) whether the distortions should be 
eliminated through Community measures or whether market forces 
and competition between national tax systems should be allowed to 
run their course; and (3) what specific Community measures are re-
quired to remove or mitigate these distortions.202 
195 KLAus VOGEL, TAXATION OF CRoss-BORDER INCOME, HARMONIZATION AND TAX NEUTRALITY 
UNDER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 15 (1994). 
196Model Tax Convention and Capital, Sept. 1, 1992, art. 3, para. 2, OECD, M-6. 
197VOGEL, supra note 195, at 14. 
198 [d. 
199Mrs. Christiane Scrivener, Address at Kangaroos Group's Annual Conference in Hamburg: 
'What kind of taxation for 1992 and beyond?" (Nov. 12, 1990) (transcript available in EC Com-
mission office in Washington, D.C.). 
200The Committee was set up pursuant to the Commission Communication "Guidelines on 
Company Taxation." GUIDELINES ON COMPANY TAXATION, supra note 5, at 148. Other members 
included Mr. de Buitleir, Mr. Descours (president of Andre, French clothing company), Mr. 
Gascon (Spanish economist), Mr. Gatto (Fiat director), Mr. Messere (former head of the Fiscal 
Affairs Division of the OECD), Dr. Radler (Professor at the University of Hamburg, Germany), 
and Dr. Vanistendael (Professor at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium). Ruding Report, 
supra note 2, at 7. 
201 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at II. 
202 [d. 
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On March 18, 1992, the Ruding Committee presented its report to 
the Commission. The Committee noted that there were major differ-
ences in the corporate tax systems, tax rates, and tax bases utilized by 
each Member State.203 Based on a simulation study and an empirical 
survey, the Committee concluded that the tax burdens on the domestic 
companies in each Member State differed and that overall, there was 
discrimination against foreign investors.204 Although the . Committee 
found that there had been some convergence of the Member States' 
tax regimes, the Committee decided that further action was needed at 
the Community level,205 The priorities outlined in the Ruding Report 
were: (1) removing the discriminatory and distortionary features of 
each country's tax system that impede cross-border business invest-
ment and shareholding; (2) setting a minimum statutory corporate tax 
rate and common rules for the tax base in order to limit excessive tax 
competition between the Member States; and (3) encouraging maxi-
mum transparency of any tax incentives granted by a Member State.206 
The Report also contained a three-phase schedule for implement-
ing the corporate tax measures that the Committee deemed necessary 
to achieve a true internal market. 207 Phase I proposals were considered 
urgent and were to be implemented by the end of 1994. These pro-
posals predominantly refine proposed and adopted Community meas-
203 Id. Chapter 3 of the report provides an overview of the tax base, the nature of the corporate 
tax system, and the corporate income tax and withholding tax rates in each Member State. Id. at 
49-65. As of January 1992, the corporate tax rates ranged from 33% in Luxembourg to 50% in 
Germany, with some income in Ireland taxed at a rate as low as 10%. Id. at 50. As of January 
1995, EC Member States imposed corporate tax rates that ranged from 28% in Sweden to 45% 
in Germany, with a 10% tax rate for manufacturing and certain internationally traded service 
income available in Ireland. ERNST & YOUNG, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 154 (1995). 
The rate quoted for Germany applies to retained profits. Id. 
204Ruding Report, supra note 2, chs. 4-5. The simulation study of chapter 4 modeled the 
corporate tax component of the cost of capital in each country from domestic and foreign 
sources. The empirical survey of chapter 5 examined the influence of tax considerations on 
location decisions. 
205 Id. chs. 7-8. As much of this convergence was attributable to the downward convergence of 
interest and inflation rates, the Committee concluded that any further convergence must be 
achieved from changes to the tax systems themselves. Id.; see also Frans Vanistendael, The Ruding 
Committee Report: A Personal View, 13 FISCAL STUD. 85, 89 (1992). 
206Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 13. Due to the Commission's close scrutiny of the use of 
direct subsidies, the Ruding Committee expressed concern that Member States may instead resort 
to tax incentives. Id. at 42. The Committee stressed the need to ensure that hidden tax incentives, 
particularly those affecting the tax base, did not distort competition within the Community. Id. 
at 192. 
207 Id. ch. 10. 
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ures.208 Phase II concerned the harmonization of the tax base, and 
Phase III included an integration proposal and refinements of the tax 
base keyed to the common accounting rules.209 The Committee linked 
the timing of these proposals to the development of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Phase II should be imple-
mented during the second phase of EMU, and Phase III was envisaged 
as being implemented concurrently with the completion of the EMU.210 
In general, the Ruding Committee's recommendations can be di-
vided into two categories: (l) those designed to eliminate the double 
taxation of cross-border income flows; and (2) those designed to 
harmonize the corporate tax systems of the Member States. The Commit-
tee acknowledged the progress made in removing obstacles to cross-
border capital flows by the implementation of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive. To further this progress, the Committee recommended that 
the twenty-five percent ownership prescribed in the Directive be re-
duced for Phase J.211 The Committee also urged that during Phase I, 
the Member States adopt both the proposed Interest and Royalty 
Directive,212 and the proposed Loss Directive,213 ratifY the Arbitration 
208Id. Phase I proposals were designed to eliminate the most pervasive discriminations and the 
greatest obstacles to multinational business operations. These proposals were also expected to 
raise the least political controversy. Vanistendael, supra note 205, at 91. 
209 Ruding Report, supra note 2, ch. 10. The Ruding Committee called for the introduction of 
a common corporate income tax system, with source-country entitlement as a feature, during the 
final step of EMU. Id. Seven of the eight Committee members endorsed a corporate tax system 
of shareholder relief developed by Radler and Blumenberg. Id. at 439-60. This proposal was not 
incorporated into the report because Mr. Messere dissented. Id. at 461-63; see alsoJens Blumen-
berg, Germany, 2 EC TAX REv. 116, 118 (1993). 
210 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 13. The second stage toward EMU began January 1, 1994. 
The third stage for EMU must start no later than January 1, 1999. Dr. Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, The 
Ruding Committee Report - An Impressive Vision of European Company Taxation for the Year 2000, 
1 EC TAX REv. 22, 24 (1992); see infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of EMU. 
211 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 203. The Committee recommended an extension of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive to all other enterprises subject to income tax for Phase II. Id. 
212 The Committee also recommended that the scope of the Interest and Royalty Directive be 
extended to include all payments between enterprises with appropriate measures to ensure 
effective taxation of the income to the beneficiary. Id. at 204-05; see supra notes 184-92 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of the proposed Interest and Royalty Directive and its 
withdrawal by the Commission. 
213 For Phase II, the Committee recommended that the Member States allow full vertical and 
horizontal loss-offsetting within groups of enterprises at the national level and full Community-
wide loss-offsetting within groups of enterprises for Phase III. Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 
206; see supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Loss Directive. 
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Convention,214 conclude comprehensive bilateral income tax treaties 
between themselves, and work in concert with the Commission to 
develop a common policy on double taxation agreements with respect 
to non-EC Member States.215 To combat tax evasion and ensure a 
sufficient level of source taxation, the Committee recommended that 
during Phase II the Commission propose a uniform withholding tax 
of thirty percent on dividend distributions by EC-resident companies 
to non EC-resident taxpayers.216 
The Committee recommendations with respect to corporate tax 
harmonization concerned the Member States' systems of integration 
of the corporate and personal income tax,217 their statutory corporate 
tax rates, and their corporate tax bases. The Ruding Committee con-
cluded that "the manner in which Member States currently provide 
relief for the double taxation of corporate profits distributed to indi-
vidual shareholders in the form of dividends constitutes a source of 
discrimination against cross-border investment flows. "218 The Ruding 
Committee did not recommend that Member States with imputation 
systems extend imputation credits to non-resident shareholders, argu-
ing that this step would not be in accordance with the principle of the 
214 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 205. The Convention has been ratified and became effective 
January 1, 1995. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. 
215Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 206. There is a long standing, comprehensive body of 
income tax treaties between the individual members of the EC. [d. A notable exception to this is 
Portugal, which has no income tax treaties or agreements with Finland, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, and Sweden. [d. In addition, there are no income tax treaties or agreements between 
the following countries: Spain and Greece and Ireland and Greece. TAX ANALYSTS, WORLDWIDE 
TREATY INDEX (1994). 
216 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 203-04. 
217 Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, and the United Kingdom currently alleviate the economic 
double taxation of dividends through an imputation credit system. [d. at 194. The imputation 
system subjects a company's profits to corporate tax liability. J.D.R. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, THE 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 14 (The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, ed. 1977). When these profits are distributed as dividends, part of the 
corporate tax is treated as tax paid by the shareholder, i.e., part of the corporate tax is imputed 
to the shareholder as a credit against the individual personal income tax liability. [d. 
218 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 207. A country operating an imputation system to integrate 
corporate and personal income taxes can deny the tax credit to foreign shareholders without 
infringing tax treaty provisions. ADAMS & WHALLEY, supra note 217, at 86. A new article relevant 
to direct taxation, article 73d, enables Member States "to apply the relevant provisions of their 
tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to 
their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested," as long as 
these provisions are not arbitrary. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 73d, amended by TEU, supra 
note 1, art. G(l5). Some commentators assert that article 73d allows Member States to continue 
to deny the benefit of imputation tax credits to foreign shareholders and clarifies that this system 
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source state's primary right to tax income attributable to activities 
within its borders.219 However, the Committee did recommend for 
Phase I that those countries currently providing relief for domestic 
source dividends paid to domestic shareholders, either in the form of 
an imputation credit or a reduced rate of personal tax, be required to 
provide equivalent relief for dividends paid out of profits from opera-
tions in other Member States.220 The Committee acknowledged the 
Member States' unwillingness to accept a uniform system of corporate 
integration in the near future, and therefore, established as a goal for 
Phase III that the Commission and the Member States determine the 
most appropriate corporate tax system for the Community.221 
In the area of tax rates, the Committee recommended that the 
Commission prepare a directive prescribing a minimum statutory cor-
porate tax rate of thirty percent during Phase I and that all Member 
States adopt a maximum statutory corporate tax rate of forty percent 
during Phase II.222 As harmonization of the corporate rates makes little 
sense without some minimum degree of harmonization of the corpo-
rate tax base, the Committee called for the establishment of an inde-
pendent group of technical experts to study the various aspects of the 
tax base during Phase J.223 In addition, the Ruding Committee recom-
mended that the Commission issue detailed proposals on items such 
as depreciation, intangibles, leasing, and stock valuations for Phases I 
and II.224 
A communication of June 24, 1992, set out the Commission's initial 
reactions to the Ruding Committee's conclusions and recommenda-
tions. 225 Generally speaking, the Commission was very supportive of the 
of corporate taxation does not infringe upon the nondiscrimination rules in the Treaty of Rome. 
See Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 460 n.3!. For a thorough discussion of the international 
issues concerning corporate tax integration, see generally Hugh Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax 
Treaties and the Division of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REv. 565 
(1992). 
219 The jurisdictional claim to tax transnational income based on a nexus between a state and 
the activities that generated the income is known as source jurisdiction. McINTYRE, supra note 
178, at 1-3. The OECD Model generally recognizes the source state's primary right to tax business 
profits attributable to activities conducted within that state. Richard Doernberg, Amending the 
OECD Model Treaty and Commentary in Response to Corporate Tax Integration, I INTERTAX 3, 4 
(1995). 
220 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 207-08. 
221Id. at 208--09. 
222Id. at 209-10. 
223Id. at 212. 
224Id. at 212-18. 
225 Commission of the European Communities, COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL 
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proposals eliminating the double taxation in cross-border flOWS.226 
With respect to the Committee's recommendations on corporate tax 
harmonization, however, the Commission was more restrained.227 The 
Commission believed that these recommendations went beyond what 
was necessary at the Community level. "In Mrs. Scrivener's view, it is 
important not to be carried away by a drive for harmonization which 
is not justified on economic grounds and which would not be consis-
tent with the principle of subsidiarity and the respective responsibilities 
of the Member States and the Community. "228 
Specifically, the Commission considered the extension of the scope 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Mergers Directive to be 
desirable and necessary.229 In July, 1993, the Commission proposed a 
directive that would extend the scope of these directives to all enter-
prises subject to corporate tax.230 The proposed Directive also amends 
the Mergers Directive to require a holding ofa minimum of twenty-five 
percent of the subsidiary's capital in order to be consistent with the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive231 and amends the Parent-Subsidiary Di-
rective to take into account taxes levied by the lower-tier subsidiaries 
when using the imputation method.232 
The Commission also endorsed both the establishment of appropri-
ate procedures for transfer price adjustments and a common approach 
AND TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE RUDING COM-
MITTEE INDICATING GUIDELINES ON COMPANY TAXATION LINKED TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE INTERNAL MARKET, SEC (92) 1118 final [hereinafter COMMISSION RESPONSE]. 
226Id. at 10. 
227Id. at 9-10. 
228Press Release accompanying COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL AND TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE RUDING COMMITTEE INDICAT-
ING GUIDELINES ON COMPANY TAXATION LINKED TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTER-
NAL MARKET at 2. See supra note 6 for a definition of subsidiarity. 
229 COMMISSION RESPONSE, supra note 225, at 13. 
230Commission Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 90/434 of 23 July 1990 
on tbe Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and 
Exchanging Shares Concerning Companies of Different Member States and Commission Pro-
posal for a Council Directive amending Directive 90/435 of 23 July 1990 on tbe Common System 
of Taxation Applicable to Parent Companies and tbeir Subsidiaries in Different Member States, 
COM(93)293 final. 
231Id. art. 2. 
232 Dirk Schelpe, Two New Proposals for a Directive Amending the 'Merger' and 'Parent-Subsidiary' 
Directives, 4 EC TAX REv. 200, 204 (1993). On April 19, 1994, tbe European Parliament approved 
tbis proposed directive adding its own amendment tbat would alter tbe definition of subsidiary. 
The proposal awaits final approval from tbe Council. Parliament Backs Proposals on Mergers, 6 
EuroWatch, May 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. 
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to the definition and treatment of thin capitalization.233 The Commis-
sion considered the recommendation regarding full vertical and hori-
zontal offsetting of losses within groups of enterprises at the national 
level to be beyond the scope of necessary Community action.234 The 
Commission concurred with the Committee's goal of neutrality of 
treatment as between foreign-source and domestic-source dividends. 
The Commission expressed concern, however, over the Committee's 
recommendation because the condition of reciprocity (requiring only 
those Member States currently providing relief for domestic-source 
dividends to provide equivalent relief for foreign-source dividends) 
limits the benefit to Member States applying imputation systems and 
tax relief systems.235 
C. Future of Direct Tax Harmonization 
Since the adoption of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the Mergers 
Directive, and the Arbitration Convention, the Council has made no 
further progress on direct tax harmonization. In part this can be 
explained by a preoccupation with the bigger picture. Effective January 
1, 1993, the new VAT system came into force, allowing Member States 
to lift internal border controls on goods, and Mrs. Scrivener had been 
consumed with making the new system work.236 Also, the second stage 
of EMU began on January 1,1994.237 During this transitional stage, the 
Member States are to strive towards price and exchange-rate stability 
and deficit reduction.238 The Council adopted recommendations estab-
233 COMMISSION RESPONSE, supra note 225, at 13-14. 
234Id. at 16. 
235Id. at 17-18; see supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text for a description of the Com-
mittee's recommendation. 
236 Andrew Hill, Survey of World Taxation: First Months Are Critical - Andrew Hill Measures The 
Progress of the EC's New VAT System, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1993, at 32. After a negative reaction by 
the Council to the Commission's 1987 proposals to approximate all Member States' VAT rates, 
collect the VAT in the country of origin of the goods, and redistribute the proceeds through a 
clearing house mechanism, the Commission adopted a more flexible approach. The new propos-
als submitted by the Commission inJune, 1990, set forth a two-phased approach to the elimination 
of fiscal frontiers. Although, an origin-based collection system was the ultimate goal, a transitional 
regime was established to continue the payment of VAT by businesses in the country of consump-
tion of the goods. VAT, supra note 9, § 6.1. This transitional regime will remain in place until at 
least the end of 1996. As of January 1, 1993, however, individuals, institutional non-taxable 
persons, and tax-exempt persons may pay VAT in the country of purchase of the goods, subject 
to some exceptions for cars, mail order sales, etc. VAT, supra note 9, § 7.1. 
237 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 109(e). 
238 Coopers & Lybrand, Economic and Monetary Union, EC Commentaries, Apr. 6, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, A1lnws File, § 6.3 [hereinafter EMU]. 
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lishing broad guidelines regarding the economic policies of the Mem-
ber States' and the Union in preparation for monetary union, which 
further distracted the Council from the issue of direct tax harmoniza-
tion.239 
The Ruding Committee presented evidence that the EC average cost 
of capital for a transnational investment project undertaken with the 
parent company's funds by a subsidiary in another Member State was 
2.1 % as compared to 0.7% for a similar project carried out domesti-
cally.240 The Committee attributed this difference to three factors: (1) 
withholding taxes on cross-border inter-corporate dividend and inter-
est payments; (2) use by some Member States of the credit rather than 
the exemption method to relieve cross-border double taxation; and 
(3) differences in corporate tax rates.241 The Ruding Committee be-
lieved that these differences distorted the functioning of the internal 
market both for goods and capital, and that these distortions required 
action at the Community level. 242 The Commission's reaction that many 
of the recommendations go beyond what is strictly necessary reflects 
the understanding that Member States are extremely reluctant to cede 
any of their sovereignty in tax matters to the Community, as well as 
self-imposed restraint in respect of the principle of subsidiarity. 
The fiscal sovereignty of the Member States will nonetheless erode 
as the Member States' economies are increasingly integrated.243 The 
thrust toward EMU, in particular the adoption of a single currency, 
will so intertwine the domestic economies that greater uniformity in 
the Member States' corporate tax systems, rates, and bases is inevita-
ble.244 The differences in the corporate tax systems of the fifty states in 
the United States provide evidence that complete harmonization of 
239 EC: Agenda of ECOFIN Council on Monday, Agence Europe, Dec. 11, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File; see Council Recommendation of December 1993, 94/7, 1994 
OJ. (L 7), and Council Recommendation of July 1994, 94/480,1994 OJ. (L 200), which set forth 
guidelines for the conduct of Member States' economic policies during stage two of EMU. EMU, 
supra note 238, § 6.1. To prepare for monetary union, the Member States must meet targets of 
low inflation and sound public finances. Europe Moves Closer to Single Currency, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMEs,Jan. 2, 1994, at 9A, see Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 103 (2). 
240 John Goldsworth, EC Commission Reviews Ruding Committee Report, Suggests Member State 
Consultations, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 177, 177 (1992). 
241 Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 460 n.23. 
242 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 69-77. 
243 Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 457. 
244 If a majority of the Member States fulfil the convergence criteria for entry into stage three 
of EMU, the European Council can decide to move to EMU in 1997. Treaty of Rome, supra note 
7, art. 109j(3). As of April 1995, however, not one Member State was able to meet the criteria for 
entry into the third stage of EMU. EMU, supra note 238, § 6.2. Assuming the first deadline passes, 
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corporate tax laws is not necessary. If the goal of accelerated economic 
unification is to be achieved, however, the differences in the Member 
States' tax systems cannot remain at the present magnitude. The busi-
ness community is not satisfied with the progress thus far, so it is 
possible that business pressures and fear of preemption may also drive 
the Member States towards a more complete alignment of corporate 
tax systems.245 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF EC DIRECT TAX HARMONIZATION ON 
U.S. TAX POLICY 
A. Implications for Su&part F 
Tax harmonization developments in the EC, particularly the adop-
tion of the Parent-Subsidiary and the Mergers Directives, require that 
U.S. multinationals reassess their European operations. For some mul-
tinationals, a European holding company structure could be extremely 
advantageous. In many cases, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive would 
allow the coordination of investment activities within the EC without 
a withholding tax cost.246 The Mergers Directive would also then be 
available for subsequent restructurings.247 Alternatively, the integrated 
European market allows some multinationals to consolidate their op-
erations. Unfortunately, both options run afoul of a U.S. tax regime 
known as subpart F.248 The provisions of subpart F need to be reex-
amined in light of these tax harmonization developments in the EC. 
The subpart F rules were first enacted in 1962 and endeavor to 
impose current shareholder taxation on designated undistributed in-
the third stage will begin automatically on January 1,1999, with those Member States which fulfil 
the convergence criteria. EMU, supra 238, § 7.1; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. I09j(4). These 
Member States will no longer have an independent economic or budgetary policy. EMU, supra 
note 238, § 8.3. Based on a recommendation from the Commission, the Council will, acting as a 
qualified majority, formulate broad economic policy guidelines. Id. 
245 See Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Single 
Market in 1994, COM(95)238 final at 4. 
246 The location of the holding company must be carefully selected as France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain have anti-abuse clauses in their national laws that implement the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, which bar application of the Directive where the ultimate parent is a non-EC resident. 
See Peter Dieben, Eurocompatability of the Swiss Tax System, 6--7 INTERTAX 313, 313-14 (1993); see 
also supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
247H. Onno Ruding, U.S. Tax Policy Is Hurting U.S. Multinationals Operating in the EG, 5 J. 
INT'L TAX'N 4, 8 (1994). The Mergers Directive only applies to reorganizations involving corpo-
rations from EC Member States. Mergers Directive, supra note 145, art. 1. 
248 Sections 951-64 of the Internal Revenue Code are collectively known as Subpart F, spe-
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come earned through a foreign corporation.249 Generally, in the ab-
sence of subpart F, a U.S. shareholder of a foreign corporation would 
not be taxed on that foreign corporation's earnings until those earn-
ings were distributed, which distribution could occur in a subsequent 
tax period, if ever.250 This delay in the payment of U.S. tax until the 
earnings are repatriated is referred to as deferral.251 If the effective rate 
of foreign tax of the foreign corporation is higher than the U.S. rate, 
this deferral of U.S. taxes does not provide any tax benefit. If the 
foreign corporation's effective rate of foreign tax is less than the U.S. 
rate, however, its U.S. shareholders may enjoy substantial benefits from 
this deferral.252 
As part of a series of tax reform proposals in 1961, the Kennedy 
Administration recommended the complete termination of the defer-
ral of U.S. tax on earnings of foreign corporations that were controlled 
by U.S. taxpayers.253 The Administration justified this proposal on the 
basis of capital export neutrality, desiring to be tax neutral with respect 
to the U.S. shareholder's choice of domestic or foreign investment.254 
Those opposed to this proposal argued that the deferral of U.S. tax on 
cifically Subpart F of part III of subchapter N of Chapter II of subtitle A of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986. I.R.C. § 951-64 (CCH 1995). 
249The Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12, 76 Stat. 960, 1006--27 (1962), reprinted 
in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1128, 1185-1211 (codified as amended in scattered sections of26 U.S.C.). 
250 The foreign corporation itself pays current U.S. tax only on U.S. source income and income 
effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business even if the foreign corporation 
is owned by U.S. shareholders. McINTYRE, supra note 178, § 2/ A, 2-7. I.R.C. § 881 (a) imposes a 
30% tax on U.S. source income such as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, and other fixed or 
determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income received by a foreign corporation. 
I.R.C. § 882(a) states that a foreign corporation engaged in a trade or business within the United 
States is taxable on its effectively connected income. Effectively connected income is "U.S. source 
gross income, reduced by properly allocable deductions, that has been derived from business 
activities or the performance of personal services carried on by a foreign taxpayer in the United 
States." McINTYRE, supra note 178, § 2/A, 2-7. Foreign source income earned through a U.S. 
office may in some cases also be characterized as effectively connected income. Id. See generally 
Harvey Dale, Effectively Connected Income, 42 TAX L. REv. 689 (1987). 
251 H.R. REp. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-58 (1962); see also BRIAN ARNOLD, THE 
TAXATION OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 83 (1986). 
252JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102ND CONG., 1ST SESS., PROPOSAL RELATING TO CURRENT U.S. 
TAXATION OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND RELATED 
ISSUES 44 (Comm. Print 1991) (H.R. REp. No. 2889 - American Jobs and Manufacturing Preser-
vation Act of 1991) [hereinafter U.S. TAXATION OF CFCs]. 
253 Message of the President Relative to Our Federal Tax System, Apr. 20, 1961, reprinted in H.R. 
REp. No. 140, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6--7 (1961). For non tax reasons, some income derived by 
foreign subsidiaries in less developed countries was excepted. 
254Id. Capital export neutrality refers to a system of international taxation where there is no 
effective domestic tax burden differential between domestic and foreign investtnents. U.S. TAXA-
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the income of U.S.-controlled foreign corporations was necessary to 
achieve capital import neutrality,255 thus enabling U.S. companies to 
compete effectively in foreign markets.256 Congress compromised by 
eliminating deferral for some categories of undistributed foreign-source 
income of U.S.-controlled foreign corporations, essentially non-oper-
ating income derived from passive foreign financial investments and 
income from manipulable activities in foreign tax-haven countries.257 
Two requirements must be met for subpart F to apply. First, a U.S. 
taxpayer must own at least ten percent of the foreign corporation's 
voting stock.258 A ten percent shareholder is known as a "U.S. share-
TION OF CFCs, supra note 252, at 37; see also PEGGY RICHMAN (now MUSGRAVE), TAXATION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 8 (1963). An international tax system in which only the investor's 
country of residence imposes tax achieves capital export neutrality. U.S. TAXATION OF CFCs, supra 
note 252, at 37. Capital export neutrality would also be possible if each country taxed income 
derived from within its borders while the investor's residence country granted unlimited foreign 
tax credits. Id. Neither of these two situations exist in the world today. According to most 
economists, only capital export neutrality satisfies the goal of economic efficiency-allocating 
production factors in such a way that productivity will be optimal. VOGEL, supra note 195, at 22. 
255 Capital import neutrality refers to a system of international taxation where income from 
investment located in each country is taxed at the same rate regardless of the residence of the 
investor. U.S. TAXATION OF CFCs, supra note 252, at 37. 
256 A.L. I. , International Aspects of United States Income Taxation l, Proposals on United States 
Taxation of Foreign Persons and of the Foreign Income of United States Persons, 171, 173 (1987) 
[hereinafter ALI-I]. 
Businessmen argue that the tax system should be neutral as between U.S. foreign investors and 
their competitors abroad. PEGGY MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
INCOME ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 119 (1969); see also President's 1961 Tax Recommendations: 
Hearings before the Comm. on Ways and Means House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2618, 
2622 (statement of Fred W. Peel, Acting Chairman of the Committee on Taxation, U.S. Council 
of the International Chamber of Commerce). The "territorial" or "exemption" system of inter-
national taxation in which each residence country exempts income earned from foreign jurisdic-
tions achieves capital import neutrality. U.S. TAXATION OF CFCs, supra note 252, at 37-38. 
Arguments for capital import neutrality may be found in RICHMAN, supra note 254, at 8-9; 
Mitsuo Sato & Richard M. Bird, International Aspects of the Taxation of Corporation and Sharehold-
ers, 22 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 384, 407 (1975). 
257S. REp. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3381-82 (1962). 
Your committee's bill does not go as far as the President [sic] recommendations. It does 
not eliminate tax deferral in the case of operating in the economically developed 
countries of the world. Testimony in hearings before your committee suggested that the 
location of investments in these countries is an important factor in stimulating American 
exports to the same areas. Moreover, it appeared that to impose the U.S. tax currently 
on the U.S. shareholders of American-owned businesses operating abroad would place 
such firms at a disadvantage with other firms located in the same areas not subject to 
U.S. tax. 
H.R. REp. No. 1447, supra note 251, at 57-58. 
258I.R.C. § 951(b) (CCH 1995). 
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holder. "2S9 Second, U.S. shareholders must own more than fifty percent 
of the foreign corporation's voting power or value.260 A foreign corpo-
ration that satisfies these requirements is known as a "controlled for-
eign corporation" (CFC).261 U.S. shareholders must include in their 
taxable income as dividends, their pro rata share of certain types of 
income known as subpart F income regardless of the fact the CFC has 
not actually distributed the income to them. In addition, U.S. share-
holders must include in income any increase in earnings invested in 
specifically defined U.S. property.262 
Subpart F income primarily includes "foreign base company in-
come," such as foreign personal holding company income and foreign 
base company sales and services income.263 Although foreign personal 
holding company income includes dividends and interest,264 these items 
of income are not tainted if received from a related person organized 
and engaged in business in the same foreign country as the recipient 
corporation.26S This is known as the same-country exception. The 
theoretical justification appears to be that as payor and payee are 
organized and operating in the same country, the considerations of 
capital import neutrality are applicable. 266 As the choice of corporate 
structure depends entirely on considerations unique to the country of 
business operation, the CFC is not deriving any inappropriate advan-
tage by using a holding company to coordinate its investment activities 
within that country.267 
259Id. 
260I.R.C. § 957(a) (CCH 1995). 
261Id. Such a corporation is commonly referred to as a CFC. 
2621.R.C. § 956(a) (CCH 1995). Section 956(b) defines such U.S. property as 
any property acquired after December 31, 1962, which is (a) tangible property located 
in the U.S., (b) stock of a domestic corporation, (c) an obligation of a U.S. person, or 
(d) any right to the use in the U.S. of - (i) a patent or copyright; (ii) an invention, 
model, or design (whether or not patented); (iii) a secret formula or process, or; (iv) 
any other similar property right which is acquired or developed by the controlled foreign 
corporation for use in the U.S. 
I.R.C. § 956(b) (CCH 1995). 
2631.R.C. § 952(a) (CCH 1995). Subpart F income also includes certain insurance income, 
international boycott income, foreign bribe income, and unfriendly country income. Id. 
264I.R.C. § 954(c) (l) (A) (CCH 1995). 
2651.R.C. § 954(c) (3) (A) (i) (CCH 1995). This exception does not apply, however, to interest 
payments that have reduced the payor's subpart F income. § 954(c) (3) (B) (CCH 1995). 
266 ALI-I, supra note 256, at 254; see supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the compromises made in enacting subpart F. 
267 ALI-I, supra note 256, at 254. 
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Foreign base company sales income is defined as sales income in-
volving a related party where the products are manufactured, pro-
duced, grown, or extracted and consumed or used in a foreign country 
other than the country in which the CFC is organized.268 In defining 
foreign base company sales income, Congress was primarily concerned 
with the income of a subsidiary established to market products and 
which had been separated from the manufacturing activities of a re-
lated corporation solely to obtain a lower tax rate for the sales income. 
The provision does not apply in those cases where the property is 
manufactured or sold in the same country where the CFC is organized 
because Congress believed that a lower rate of tax was likely to be 
obtained only through purchases and sales outside of the country of 
incorporation.269 
Similarly, foreign base company services income is income derived 
from the performance of services for or on behalf of a related person 
outside the country in which the CFC is organized.270 As in the case of 
sales income, the purpose of subpart F as applied to services income 
was "to deny tax deferral where a service subsidiary is separated from 
manufacturing or similar activities of a related corporation and organ-
ized in another country primarily to obtain a lower rate of tax for the 
service income."271 
Congress has always provided an exception from the subpart F rules 
for foreign subsidiaries that are not established in tax-haven coun-
tries.272 As enacted in 1962, income could be excluded from subpart F 
if it were established that the CFC did not substantially reduce taxes.273 
This exception was revised by the Tax Reform Act of 1969274 so that it 
subsequently became necessary to establish that reducing taxes was not 
a significant purpose of earning the income through the CFC.275 In 
268LR.C. § 954(d)(l) (CCH 1995). 
269 S. REp. No. 1881, supra note 257, at 3387. 
270LR.C. § 954(e)(l) (CCH 1995). Such services include technical, managerial, engineering, 
or similar services. Id. 
271 S. REp. No. 1881, supra note 257, at 3387. 
272 The term "tax haven" is subject to varying interpretations. See U.S. TAXATION OF CFCs, supra 
note 252, at 9-10. Relatively low rates of tax; high levels of bank secrecy; no tax treaties or treaties 
that provide for no, or very limited, exchanges of information; a disproportionately large financial 
sector; and self promotion as an offshore financial center are some of the generally accepted 
characteristics of tax havens. RICHARD GoRDON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 'TREASURY, TAX HAVENS 
AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS - AN OVERVIEW 14-20 (1981). 
273LR.C. § 954(b)(4)(CCH 1962). 
274 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
275LR.C. § 954(b)(4)(CCH 1969), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 
§ 909(a), 83 Stat. 487, 718. 
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practice, as this was difficult to establish, taxpayers relied on regula-
tions allowing the exclusion from subpart F if the sales income had 
borne an effective tax rate equal to at least ninety percent of, or no 
more than five percentage points less than, the rate of tax applicable 
in either the country of manufacture or the country of destination of 
the goods.276 For services income, reference was made solely to the tax 
rate in the country in which the services were performed.277 
Section 954(b)(4), as amended, now provides that foreign base 
company income does not include any item of income, measured 
under U.S. tax rules, that is subject to an income tax imposed by a 
foreign country at an effective rate exceeding ninety percent of the 
highest U.S. corporate tax rate.278 Such income is exempt from subpart 
F taxation because Congress concluded that the denial of deferral was 
not necessary when foreign countries tax the income at rates approxi-
mating or exceeding the U.S. corporate rate.279 
The rationale for requiring a comparison between the foreign tax 
paid and the U.S. tax rate is unclear.280 Because foreign base company 
sales income arises only if the CFC deriving the income is incorporated 
in a jurisdiction that is neither the country of manufacture nor the 
country of the destination of the sale, there are no subpart F tax 
consequences if the CFC is incorporated at the destination of the sale 
regardless of the tax rate in that jurisdiction.281 Thus, tax deferral is 
accepted so long as the CFC is organized and operated in its natural 
business locus to protect the competitive position of the corporation 
in that country.282 Under the rate comparison test that was in effect 
prior to 1986, a single CFC could sell into more than one foreign 
country without generating subpart F income provided that the for-
276Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1 (b)(3) & (4)(iii)(a)(1972). 
277 Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1 (b) (4) (iii)(b)(1972). 
2781.R.C. § 954(b) (4), amended by Tax Reform Act ofl986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221 (d), 100 
Stat. 2085, 2553. Currently, the highest corporate tax rate is 35%, so the exclusion applies 
whenever foreign countries tax an item at an effective rate exceeding 31.5% (for taxable years 
prior to 1993,90% of34%, or 30.6%).I.R.C. § 11 (CCH 1995); see BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWKENCE 
LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 56-68 (2d ed. 1991). This is referred to 
as the high-tax exception. 
279 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 983 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK]. 
280 ALI-I, supra note 256, at 289. The House Ways and Means Committee's explanation is as 
follows: 'The committee's judgment is that because movable income could often be as easily 
earned through a u.S. corporation as a foreign corporation, a U.S. taxpayer's use of a foreign 
corporation to earn that income may be motivated primarily by tax considerations." H.R. REp. 
No. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1986). 
281 ALI-I, supra note 256, at 289; see Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a) (3)(iv), ex. 2 (as amended in 1983). 
282 ALI-I, supra note 256, at 260. 
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eign taxes paid were not substantially less than the tax the CFC would 
have paid if it had been organized and operated in the destination 
country.283 The effect of the 1986 amendment is to require the forma-
tion of a CFC in each foreign country for which goods are destined, 
or to encourage the manufacturing of goods in the foreign country in 
order to achieve the same tax result.284 
United States multinationals have complained that the high-tax 
exception of § 954(b) (4) does not always exempt U.S. foreign subsidi-
aries that are located in non-tax haven countries such as the EC 
Member States.285 Thus, in order to sell products in the EC without 
being subject to current taxation under subpart F, U.S. multinationals 
must establish a separate subsidiary in each EC country in which they 
plan to do business.286 Furthermore, if the U.S. multinational estab-
lishes a European holding company in order to take advantage of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the dividends paid to the holding com-
pany (if not organized in the same country as the subsidiary) are 
subpart F income. Certain U.S. companies have testified that this has 
resulted in inefficient operation of their businesses and an inability to 
compete effectively in the EC single market.287 
While most countries do not tax the foreign profits of non-resident 
entities until repatriated, countries such as Australia, Canada, France, 
Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom have all followed the U.S. example by enacting some 
form of CFC legislation.288 However, these anti-deferral systems are 
generally much narrower in scope than the U.S. system. For example, 
283Id. at 291. 
284Id. at 290. "[Ilt is unclear what policy goal is served by requiring taxpayers to proliferate 
foreign tax entities to achieve a tax result when the same result could be more efficiently achieved 
through a single entity." Id. at 291. 
285 EC Member States impose corporate tax rates that range from 28% in Sweden to 45% in 
Germany (as of January 1995). The rate quoted for Germany applies to retained profits. ERNST 
& YOUNG, supra note 203, at 154. Ireland, however, has a 10% tax rate for manufacturing and 
certain internationally traded services income. Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 50, 64. Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, and Ireland do not fit the classic definition of tax havens but do offer 
tax incentives to attract the mobile aspects of multinational corporations. Sandler, supra note 32, 
at 6-7; see also supra note 272. 
286 See SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 8. Mr. Michael Smart of Rank Xerox also 
complained that the current subpart F rules encourage the manufacture of goods in Europe in 
order to avoid the application of the rules. Id. 
287 MisceUaneous Revenue Issues: Hearings Befare the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the 
Comm. on Ways and Means House of Representatives, H.R. REp. No. 631, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993) (statement of]. Michael Farren, Vice President of External Affairs, Xerox Corporation). 
288 Sandler, supra note 32, at 11 nn.ll, 24. The elimination of foreign exchange controls has 
prompted most countries to enact CFC legislation. Id. at 10. 
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most CFC regimes do not require their residents to include currently 
unremitted active business income derived from wholly foreign activi-
ties by foreign subsidiaries.289 Treaty relief is possible for residents of 
countries such as Germany and Japan that include tainted sales and 
services income.29o In the case of Germany, the attributable tainted 
income is treated like a dividend and is eligible for any tax treaty 
exemption for dividends received from foreign subsidiary corpora-
tions.291 Seventeen of Japan's treaties include tax-sparing provisions 
that grant tax credits in Japan even when subsidiaries operate abroad 
in a country under a tax holiday. 292 
Furthermore, the CFC regimes in all countries except New Zealand, 
Germany, Canada, and Japan apply to designated jurisdictions rather 
than certain defined transactions; the scope of the regime is limited to 
CFC's in tax haven or low tax jurisdictions specified on a "black list."293 
Few of those countries using the designated jurisdiction approach have 
any EC Member States on their list. Thus, foreign-based multinationals 
can use a single company to sell and service products throughout the 
EC yet still defer home country tax on their cross-border sales and 
service activities. 294 To enhance the ability of U.S. companies to com-
pete in global markets, the United States should seek greater harmoni-
zation of its tax rules with those of its major competitors.295 
In response to these concerns, Congressman Gibbons (D-FL), a 
senior member of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced 
legislation in the JOIst, I02nd, and I03rd Congresses which would 
have amended § 954(b) to treat the Member States as a single country 
for purposes of the subpart F rules.296 Similar legislation was introduced 
in the Senate by Senator Roth in the I02nd Congress.297 Congressmen 
289Peter R. Merrill & Robert]. Patrick, U.S. International Tax Policy For a Global Economy, 4 
TAX NOTES INT'L 137, 140 (1992). An exception is the CFC regime of New Zealand in which all 
foreign-source income earned by the CFC is attributed to New Zealand shareholders. Andrew 
M.C. Smith, New FIF and CFC Regime Introduced in New Zealand, 8 INTERTAX 371, 372 (1993). 
290 Income from the sales of goods which neither originate from Germany nor are delivered 
into Germany is not, however, tainted income. Dr.Juergen Killias, Business operations in Germany, 
962 TAX MGMT. 1, A-71 [hereinafter Germany). 
291 Sandler, supra note 32, at 20, 90; see Germany, supra note 290, at A-71. 
292 Sandler, supra note 32, at 99-101. The treaty with Luxembourg provides for continued 
application of japan's CFC provisions to Luxembourg holding companies. Id. at 100; see also 
Daniel B. Pickard, Tax Conferences: World Trade Institute Examines International Tax Rules of Key 
Asia-Pacific Countries, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 494,499 (1994). 
293 Sandler, supra note 32, at 87 n.9; see also Smith, supra note 289, at 373. 
294Merrill & Patrick, supra note 289, at 137. 
295Id. 
296H.R. 1401, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) is the latest piece of legislation. 
297 Senator Roth's bill would have treated the EC as a single country for subpart F purposes 
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Levin and Houghton have included a provision to treat countries in 
the EU as a single country for purposes of the same-country exception 
in the International Tax Simplification and Reform Act of 1995.298 
The Treasury Department was opposed to this legislation. In its view, 
"the lack of direct tax harmonization creates inappropriate tax plan-
ning opportunities. "299 The prior Administration had also stated the 
concern that a U.S. company could establish a subsidiary in a low-tax 
member of the EC and avoid subpart F inclusion on a significant 
portion of its EC business income.30o The Treasury's position was that 
the possibility of tax avoidance in the establishment of a single EC base 
company was too great so long as the effective income tax rates varied 
as greatly as they did.30l The Treasury Department was concerned 
about the myriad of deduction and credit rules and enterprise zones 
that result in low taxes for certain industries in specific locations and 
provide unwarranted tax avoidance opportunities.302 
While EC countries generally are not considered low-tax countries,303 
some Member States have special tax regimes for specific locations that 
offer significantly reduced tax rates or other tax incentives such as 
accelerated depreciation.304 A number of Member States such as Bel-
gium, France, Ireland, and Luxembourg have created special regimes 
for financial and management activities that may take advantage of a 
partial or total exemption from corporate tax, a special definition of 
the tax base, and other incentives.305 For example, companies estab-
lished in Dublin's financial center or the customs-free airport zone in 
and would have adjusted the effective tax rate for the high-tax exception to 80%. S. 1733, 102nd 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Senator Moynihan also introduced legislation in the 102nd Congress but 
his bill solely adjusted the high-tax exception. S. 1653, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see supra 
note 278 and accompanying text for an explanation of the high-tax exception. 
298H.R. 1690, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
299 Miscellaneous Revenue Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the 
Committee on Ways and Means House of Representatives, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 299, 299 (1993) 
(statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec. Dept. of Treasury). 
300 Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Asst. Sec. of Treasury (Tax Policy), to Dan Rostenkowski, 
Chairman of the Comm. on Ways and Means 3 (Mar. 15, 1990) [hereinafter Gideon letter]. 
301Id. 
302Id. at 4. 
303 See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 203, at 154. 
304 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 53. Some examples are the Shannon Free Airport Develop-
ment Zone in Ireland, the special enterprise zones located near Dunkirk, Aubagne-La-Ciotat, and 
Toulon La Seyne in France, the enterprise zones in the UK, the reconversion zones and T-zones 
in Belgium, the free zones of Madeira and Santa Maria Islands in Portugal, and the Canary Islands 
of Spain. Id. 
305Id. Some examples are the Belgium Coordination Centers, the Dublin International Finan-
cial Services Centre, and the Luxembourg Societes des Participations Financieres (SOPARFI). Id. 
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Shannon prior to the end of the year 2000 are eligible for a ten percent 
tax rate until the year 2005. The corporate tax rate for service compa-
nies established elsewhere in Ireland is forty percent.306 
The Ruding Committee shared the U.S. Treasury Department's con-
cern that the growing mobility of capital increases the temptation for 
EC Member States to attract capital from each other's jurisdictions by 
offering lower effective tax rates and special tax schemes designed to 
attract internationally mobile business.307 As economies become in-
creasingly globally integrated, the competition for investment will be-
come more intense.308 Nevertheless, the Committee concluded there 
was no convincing evidence that tax competition would lead to a 
serious erosion of corporate tax revenues.309 
As a safeguard against such competition, the Community has pro-
scribed the amount of State aid that can be paid to companies.310 In 
addition, the Commission has a competition department that must 
approve tax law changes.311 Since 1986, every Member State except for 
Italy and Spain has reduced its corporate tax rates,312 yet corporate tax 
revenues as a percentage ofGDP and of total tax revenues have risen.313 
These rate reductions were usually accompanied by base broadening 
involving the curtailment or repeal of special allowances such as invest-
ment tax credits and incentives for investment in certain industries or 
regions.314 
The same-country exception from subpart F allows for deferral so 
long as the CFC is organized and operated in its natural business locus, 
and tax planners have questioned whether the EC, as a whole, can be 
considered such a natural business locus. The most obvious objection 
to this suggestion is that the EC does not have a single corporate 
income tax system and thus may provide inappropriate tax avoidance 
306Nigel Tutt, European Commission Extends Deadline for New Projects in Irish Financial Center, 
Customs-Free Zone, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1897, 1897 (1994). 
307 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 143. 
3081d. at 165. 
3091d. at 200-01. 
310 ld. at 160. 
311 SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 19. 
312 MESSERE, supra note 133, at 327. 
313 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 166. Average EC corporate tax revenues accounted for 3% 
of GDP in 1989 as compared with 2.5% in 1980, and 7.5% of total revenues in 1989 as compared 
with 6.6% in 1980. ld. at 154. Average EC corporate tax revenues accounted for 2.8% of GDP 
and 6.7% of total revenues in 1992. OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 
1965-199378 (1994) [hereinafter OECD Table]. 
314 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 154. 
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opportunities. Firms located in a single country, however, may have 
similar tax avoidance opportunities because many federal governments 
do not have the same corporate income tax system at the subnational 
level. 
Switzerland is illustrative of the diversity in tax laws acceptable within 
a single country. Of the federal countries, Switzerland is most analo-
gous to the EC as it was created by an association of completely 
sovereign cantons with the goal of maintaining the traditions, lan-
guages, and customs of each of these cantons.315 The Constitution of 
1848 transformed the confederation of cantons into the present fed-
eral state and transferred the power to raise custom duties to the 
national government.316 
The national government of Switzerland relies predominantly on 
indirect taxes while the twenty-six cantons and approximately 3,000 
communes earn most of their revenues from direct taxation.317 Spe-
cifically, the cantons of Switzerland raise approximately 12.6% of their 
total tax revenues from corporate taxes, relying more heavily on cor-
porate taxes than most of the national governments in the EC Member 
States.3lS Each canton has its own income tax act and these tax acts are 
in some cases quite diverse.319 For example, while the classical system 
of corporate taxation prevails in Switzerland, three cantons operate a 
split-rate system whereby a lower rate of tax is levied on a corporation's 
distributed earnings than on retained earnings.32o 
There is, however, progress toward the harmonization of the can-
tons' direct tax systems. The Swiss Parliament adopted the Federal Law 
on Harmonization of the Direct Taxes of the Cantons and Municipali-
ties in December 1990, and the law became effective January 1,1993.321 
Although the cantons are expected to amend their own legislation in 
alignment with the basic taxation principles established in the Federal 
Income Tax Act, the cantons will continue to establish their own tax 
schedules, rates, deductions, and allowances.322 Currently, the com-
315 Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 444. 
316 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 397. 
3171d. 
3180ECD Table, supra note 313, at 74. 
319 Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 442. 
320 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 401. 
321 Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 447. The cantons are allowed eight years to change their 
cantonal laws but thereafter the law becomes self-executing. ld. The model tax law provides a 
mandate for working toward uniform definitions of tax entities, the tax base, and taxpayers, and 
rules for tax dispute resolution. Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 408. 
322 Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 447. 
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bined cantonal and communal corporate income tax rates range from 
9.9% to 29.6%,323 not too different from the corporate income tax rates 
in the EC, which range from 10% to 45%.324 
The Swiss cantons freely compete for business investment through 
tax rate reductions and tax concessions designed to encourage re-
gional development.325 The cantons also have the authority to conclude 
tax treaties with foreign governments and some have done so, although 
these cantonal treaties are primarily concerned with inheritance taxes 
or the taxation of frontier workers. 326 Obviously, the harmonization of 
Swiss cantonal corporate tax law is greater than that of the EC Member 
States due in part to the common accounting practices as well as a 
single currency within Switzerland.327 But the tax diversity within Swit-
zerland, which is considered a natural business locus, strongly suggests 
that the EC could be considered a natural business locus. 
Other factors to consider include the fact that incorporation as a 
European corporation in Europe is not yet possible. The proposed 
regulation on the European Company Statute has not been adopted 
because of political differences concerning worker representation.328 
Adoption of this statute requires only a qualified majority,329 but Ger-
many, Ireland, and the United Kingdom remain opposed.330Movement 
may occur in the future as a result of the enlargement of the EC 
because the qualified majority necessary for adoption has changed.331 
Similarly, in many cases European companies are unable to consoli-
date their separate country subsidiaries because corporate law does not 
323Id. at 448. The tax rates depend on the return on equity of the corporation. Dieben, supra 
note 246, at 316. 
324 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 203, at 154. 
325 Daly & Weiner, supra note 41, at 448. 
326Id. at 449. 
327Id. at 445. 
328 Oster, supra note 54, at HI. The proposed regulation on the European Company Statute 
and the accompanying directive on worker's representation are designed to allow freedom of 
establishment in the single market. Amelia Torres, Belgium Tries to Get Qualified Majority on 
European Company, Reuter Eur. Community Rep., Oct. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Reuec File. The Statute provides four ways of forming a European Company: merger, formation 
of a holding company, formation of a joint subsidiary, or conversion of a public limited company. 
Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 1991 OJ. 
(C 176). 
329The regulation is based on article 100a and therefore only requires a qualified majority in 
the Council for adoption. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 100a. 
330 The V.K. and Ireland are strongly opposed to a mandatory model for worker participation 
while Germany does not believe the Commission has gone far enough. Torres, supra note 328. 
331 John Robinson, Tax and the Single European Company, EC TAX NOTES, Oct. 1993-Apr. 1994, 
at 3. When Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EV, the qualified majority blocking vote 
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provide for such mergers.332 In France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
however, it appears that mergers of subsidiaries into new or pre-exist-
ing European companies may take place within the existing legal 
framework. Transfers of assets and exchanges of shares generally are 
also already possible as all Member States, except for Greece, have 
domestic laws which permit and recognize such cross-border transac-
tions. 333 All Member States but Greece have also implemented the 
relevant provisions of the Mergers Directive so that tax deferral of any 
capital gains tax liability is available. Thus, European companies can 
establish a single European company structure indirectly by using the 
asset transfer provision.334 
There are changes in the way European companies are doing busi-
ness; centralized warehouses and the consolidation of operations allow 
European companies to become more efficient.335 The new VAT system 
for intra-community trade became effective January 1, 1993 and, in 
general, the transition went more smoothly than anticipated.336 Of the 
282 measures in the White Paper, only eighteen have not been ap-
proved by EC members.337 Enough progress has been made to ensure 
that the Community will begin to reap the financial rewards that were 
promised by the EC 92 program. Furthermore, the push toward EMU 
will make harmonization inevitable. 
In the meantime, U.S. companies should not be encouraged to 
establish or continue inefficient corporate structures solely for U.S. tax 
purposes as they strive to take advantage of EC opportunities. The 
advantages of an EC holding company structure are often outweighed 
by the implementation and operational costs imposed under U.S. tax 
law.338 U.S. companies are unable to reallocate capital within an EC 
increased, diluting the UK, Ireland, and Germany "veto" on this issue. See EU Enlargement, supra 
note 80, § 3.3. 
332 SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 5. The Tenth Company Law Directive, which would 
enable cross-border legal mergers and divisions to the extent not provided for by domestic 
company law, has not yet been adopted. Cussons, supra note 23, at 111; see also Coopers & 
Lybrand, Company Law, EC Commentaries, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Eurcom File, § 3.3. 
333 See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. 
334Robinson, supra note 331, at 2. 
335 Oster, supra note 54, at H3. 
336 Albert]. Radler, Where Does Tax Harmonization Stand Today?, 4 EC TAX REv. 198, 199 (1993). 
337Robinson, supra note 331, at 2. 
338 Ruding, supra note 247, at 4. Gain recognition or a potentially punitive gain recognition 
agreement with the IRS is required when a U.S. parent company transfers ownership of a foreign 
subsidiary to a foreign holding company. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3T(g) (1986). 
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holding company structure efficiently because dividends between re-
lated companies organized in different countries are treated as subpart 
F income.339 Furthermore, they may not be able to avoid foreign divi-
dend withholding taxes because, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain 
have anti-abuse clauses in their laws implementing the Parent-Subsidi-
ary Directive which bar application of the directive where the ultimate 
parent is a non-EC resident. 34o 
The concern over tax avoidance is legitimate, but most of the EC 
special tax regimes are targeted at manufacturing or financial serv-
ices income. Manufacturing in the CFC's country of incorporation is 
sufficient to preclude application of subpart F regardless of where the 
sales activity transpires. For example, under present law a U.S. com-
pany is able to locate a manufacturing plant in Ireland to take advan-
tage of the special ten percent tax rate for manufacturing income, sell 
this product throughout the EC, and preserve the benefit of deferral 
on all the income.341 This income would not be considered foreign base 
company sales income because the manufacturing took place outside 
the United States. Similarly, many of the EC special tax regimes are 
targeted at services income, which is also eligible for the same-country 
exception as long as the services are performed in the country in 
which the CFC is incorporated. The Treasury's tax avoidance concerns 
should be alleviated if a foreign base company is permitted to treat the 
EC as a single country only if subject to the regular corporate tax 
regime of the country of its incorporation. 
The Treasury Department also argues that other regional trading 
blocs can contend with equal force so that they should also be treated 
as a single country if the EC receives such treatment. Treasury's con-
cern, that general application would unravel subpart F, seems prema-
ture. 342 Single country treatment of other economic regions is justified 
only after they have established, as the EC has done, an institutional 
structure that allows the trading bloc to vigorously pursue the harmoni-
zation of their economies, currencies, and laws. To date, none of the 
regional trading blocs have any of the federal characteristics of the EC 
or the goal of pursuing far-reaching economic, monetary, and legal 
339I.R.C. § 954(c) (3) (CCH 1995); see Ruding, supra note 247, at 4. 
340 Dieben, supra note 246, at 313; see also supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
341 See SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 8. Mr. Michael Smart of Rank Xerox com-
plained that the current subpart F rules encourage the manufacture of goods in Europe in order 
to avoid the application of the rules. Id. 
342 Gideon letter, supra note 300, at 4. 
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harmonization. Although there is not a compelling case to treat the 
EC as a single country at this time, given the work that remains on the 
harmonization of direct taxes, company law, and monetary union, 
administrability, simplicity, and economic efficiency argue for such 
treatmen t. 343 
B. Us. Tax Treaty Policy Implications 
The sovereignty to conclude bilateral tax treaties has not been trans-
ferred from the Member States to the EC.344 Instead, the United States 
has ratified individual tax treaties with each of the fifteen Member 
States.345 As an integral part of its treaty policy, the United States now 
includes in all tax treaties, a limitation on benefits article designed to 
prevent persons without a sufficient nexus to the treaty country from 
obtaining the benefits of the treaty.346 The U.S.-Netherlands Income 
343Taxpayers record-keeping burden would be reduced for purposes of tax return filing, the 
tracking of previously taxed income, and determining the credibility of foreign taxes under I.R.C. 
§ 960. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM: AN INTERIM REpORT 
10 (1993). If a taxpayer is not in an excess foreign tax credit position, there is also a reduced 
need for tax planning either to avoid the foreign base company sales and services income 
provisions or to arrange for the cross-<:rediting of high foreign taxes paid on other foreign 
earnings against the residual U.S. tax on this income. [d. 
344The Community's authority to engage in negotiations with respect to the taxation of divi-
dends by a subsidiary to its parent or the exchange of information seems clear. However, the EC 
does not have authority to negotiate and conclude a double taxation convention that would cover 
the whole range of income taxation. VOGEL, supra note 195, at 15. The Treaty of Rome only 
confers external powers on the Community with respect to specific policy areas such as the 
common commercial policy (arts. 110-115), association agreements with third countries (art. 
238), and the environment (art. 130r(4». BEN ThRRA & PETER WATTEL, EUROPEAN TAX LAw 44 
(1993). Pursuant to the AETR case, the Community also has implied powers with respect to 
non-Member States whenever the Community law confers internal powers upon the Community 
in order to obtain an objective. [d. 
345 Andre Fogarasi et. aI., Current Status of u.s. Tax Treaties, 23 TAX MGMT INT'LJ. 95 (1994). 
The United States Senate approved income tax treaties with France, Portugal, and Sweden on 
August 11, 1995. Senate Ratifies Treaties between United States and Six Countries, 1995 DAILY TAX 
REpORT, Aug. 14, 1995, at 156, G6, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnadtr File. The U.S. 
Treasury has renegotiated the tax treaties with Austria and Luxembourg. Sarah Barth, U.S. Tax 
Treaty UPdate, 11 TAX NOTES INT'L 1018, 1046 (1995). Furthermore, the United States began 
negotiations with Ireland on July 24, 1995, to update the current income tax treaty signed in 
1949. 1995 DAILY TAX REpORT,July 25,1995, at 142, Gl, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnadtr 
File. 
346 Only residents and nationals of a treaty country are entitled to benefits under a tax treaty. 
McINTYRE, supra note 178, at 2-72. Residents of third countries sometimes attempt to obtain 
treaty benefits by organizing some juridical entity in one treaty country to serve as a conduit for 
income earned in the other treaty country. [d. This practice is referred to as treaty shopping, 
thus limitation on benefits articles are also known as anti-treaty shopping clauses. [d. 
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Tax Treaty,347 signed on December 18, 1992, generated some contro-
versy with respect to its limitation on benefits article.348 
The issue is whether article 26, the limitation on benefits article of 
the U.S.-Netherlands treaty, is compatible with articles 6, 52, and 58 
of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibit discrimination on grounds of 
nationality and provide for the freedom of establishment.349 Article 26 
contains several shareholder tests designed to ensure that only genuine 
residents benefit from the treaty. These tests may result in the denial 
of a treaty benefit, such as a reduction in withholding tax on dividends, 
interest, or royalties, where the shareholder of the Dutch company 
resides in another Member State.350 Some commentators argue that ex-
cluding Dutch companies with EC parents from treaty benefits conflicts 
with the freedom of establishment under the Treaty of Rome.351 The 
bilateral tax treaties between the United States and Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium, and Spain present similar issues.352 
The Ruding Committee noted that although multilateral relations 
between Member States with respect to withholding taxes have become 
increasingly harmonized because of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 
relations with non-Member States have not been affected. The Mem-
ber States continue to negotiate bilateral treaties with non-Member 
States that exclude cross-border dividend, interest, and royalty payments 
347 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., art. 37, S. 
TREATY Doc. No.6, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 321.L.M. 462 (1993) [hereinafter 
Netherlands Treaty]; see Jean-Louis D. Chicha & Jeffrey A. Johnson, The New U.S.-Netherlands 
Tax Treaty: Understanding the International Tax Planning Implications, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 1509, 
1509 (1993). 
348 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 347, art. 26. 
349 Dirk van Unnik & Maarten Boudesteijn, The New U.S.-Dutch Tax Treaty and the Treaty of 
Rome, 2 EC TAX REv. 106, 106 (1993). Article 6 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 6, amended by TEU, supra note 1, 
art. G(8). According to article 52, any company incorporated under the laws of any EC country 
must be able to establish itself in any other EC country under the same conditions as a local 
company. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 52. Article 58 explicitly provides the right of freedom 
of establishment to corporations. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 58. 
350 See TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 344, at 46; see also infra notes 368-70 and accompanying 
text. 
351 Van Unnik & Boudesteijn, supra note 349, at 107; see, e.g., Rijkele Betten, Fundamental 
Aspects of EC Measures Regarding Company Law and Direct Taxation, 31 EUR. TAX'N 289, 289 
(1991); Helmut Becker & Otmar Thommes, Treaty Shopping and EC Law, 31 EUR. TAX'N 173, 
173 (1991). 
352 Martin Du Bois, EC Commission Outlines Cautious Corporate Tax Plan, WALL ST. J., June 19, 
1992, at 2; see also Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 138. Vogel asserts that article 28 of the 
U.S.-German Tax Convention, which denies certain treaty benefits to companies owned by citizens 
of third states, is an infringement upon Community law. VOGEL, supra note 195, at 15. The 
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from treaty protection in the case of treaty shopping situations.353 The 
Committee also stated that treaty provisions such as the limitation on 
benefits provisions negotiated by the United States may not be com-
patible with the fundamental principles of Community law such as the 
freedom of establishment as far as residents of other Member States 
are concerned.354 Therefore, the Ruding Committee stressed the need 
for coordinating the Member States' tax treaty policies at the Commu-
nity level with the goal of approximating the tax treaty provisions in 
areas covered by Community law (such as withholding taxes on divi-
dends) and avoiding conflicts with the Treaty of Rome.355 Other prob-
lem areas are the different definitions of essential terms such as resi-
dency, permanent establishments, dividends, etc., and the extension of 
imputation tax credits in a more favorable way than to taxpayers in the 
other Member States.356 
Limitation on benefits provisions, also known as anti-treaty shop-
ping clauses, have become an integral part of U.S. tax treaty policy. 
The U.S.-Luxembourg Treaty was the first U.S. tax treaty to incorpo-
rate such a provision.357 Treasury was initially responding to the situ-
ation where a foreign investor who resides in a country without a treaty 
European Commission is examining this question. See Written Question [from the European 
Parliament) No. 2046/90 of Mr. Gijs de Vries and answer by Commissioner Scrivener on February 
11, 1991, 1991 OJ. (C 79) 28. 
353 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 206. 
354Id. at 138. 
355Id. at 206. "The Committee recommends action by the Commission in concert with Member 
States aimed at defining a common attitude with regard to policy on double taxation agreements 
with respect to each other and also with respect to third countries (Phase I)." Id. 
356 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 379. 
357 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962, U.S.-Lux., 15 
U .S.T. 2355 [hereinafter Luxembourg Treaty). The limitation on benefits article states that 
[t) he present Convention shall not apply to the income of any holding company entitled 
to any special tax benefit under Luxembourg Law of July 31, 1929, and Decree Law of 
December 27, 1937, or under any similar law subsequently enacted, or to any income 
derived from such companies by any shareholders thereof. In the event that substantially 
similar benefits are granted to other corporations under any law enacted by Luxem-
bourg after the date of signature of the present Convention, the provisions ofthe present 
Convention shall not apply to the income of any such corporation or to any income 
derived from such corporation by any shareholder thereof. The expression 'substantially 
similar benefits' shall be deemed not to include tax reduction or exemption granted to 
any corporation in respect of dividends derived from another corporation, 25% or more 
of the stock of which is owned by the recipient corporation. 
!d. art. XV. As of September 1995, the United States and Luxembourg have completed negotia-
tions and initialed a comprehensive income tax treaty intended to replace this 1962 tax conven-
tion. Barth, supra note 345, at 1046. 
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with the United States forms a legal entity in a tax haven jurisdiction 
with a favorable treaty with the United States. The legal entity avails 
itself of treaty benefits to which the investor was not directly entitled.358 
The policy concern was that if residents of countries without income 
tax treaties with the United States already had effective access to treaty 
benefits, there was no incentive to enter into such a tax treaty and grant 
reciprocal concessions to the United States and its investors.359 
In 1981, the United States Department of Treasury issued a draft 
U.S. model income tax treaty which contained a limitation on benefits 
article.360 Since then, Treasury has attempted to restrict the availability 
of U.S. income tax treaty benefits during all subsequent income tax 
treaty negotiations with the inclusion of a limitation on benefits provi-
sion as one of the primary objectives.361 All treaties ratified by the 
United States Senate since 1980 have contained such a provision.362 
The comprehensive approach currently being taken, however, ap-
plies to all corporations organized in a treaty country regardless of 
whether they benefit from special measures in that country and regard-
less of whether the country operates as a tax haven.363 The objective 
of the comprehensive limitation on benefits provisions is to restrict 
source-country tax benefits to legal entities resident in the treaty 
country who are fully subject to residence taxation.364 This obsession 
358 A.L.I., International Aspects of United States Income Taxation II: Proposals on United States 
Income Tax Treaties, 150, 151 (1992) [hereinafter AU-Treaties]. 
359Id. at 152. 
360U.S. Department of Treasury, Proposed Model Convention Between the United States and 
__ For the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, art. 16 (1981) 
reprinted in I Tax Treaties (CCH 1993) [hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty]. This model was with-
drawn inJuly 1992. Treasury Announces Review of Model Income Tax Treaty, TREASURY NEWS,July 
17, 1992. Treasury is currently updating the model treaty to reflect changes in treaty policy, 
significant changes made to the international provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and 
changes in the OECD Model Tax Convention. Charles Cope, U.S. Income Tax Treaties: Notes and 
Comments on Some Present and Future Policies, 8 TAXES 955, 956 (1993). 
361 William P. Streng, "Treaty Shopping": Tax Treaty "Limitation of Benefits" Issues, 15 HOUSTON 
J. OF INT'L LAw 1, 7 (1992). 
362Id. at 26. 
363 ALI-Treaties, supra note 358, at 153; see, e.g., Supplementary Protocol Modifying and Sup-
plementing the Convention Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income, opened for signature July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg., art. 12, reprinted in I Tax Treaties para. 
1340 (CCH 1995); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, Aug. 29, 1989, 
U.S.-F.R.G., art. 28, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties para. 3249 (CCH 1995). 
364 ALI-Treaties, supra note 358, at 154. The qualifying tests of the standard limitation on 
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with treaty shopping has led to limitation on benefits articles that may 
be excessively detailed and complex, as well as difficult to administer. 365 
The most poignant example of this complexity can be found in 
article 26 of the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty.366 This limitation on benefits 
article is twenty-three pages in length, longer than some tax treaties.367 
To qualifY for the benefits of the treaty, a Dutch company must comply 
with the requirements of a stock quotation test, an activities test, a 
headquarters company test, or a shareholder test. 368 These tests do take 
into consideration, to a limited extent, shareholders and/or activities 
in other EC Member States.369 However, a company resident in another 
EC state is factored into the test only if it would qualifY for treaty 
benefits if it were a Dutch resident and if the treaty between its coun-
try of residence and the United States would have offered the same 
benefits.370 
One resolution to the controversy over the compatibility of the treaty 
shopping rules with the Treaty of Rome is the negotiation of a single 
treaty with the entire EC.371 The adoption of such a treaty would 
produce significant benefits for the United States.372 Many of the trea-
ties negotiated with the EC Member States are antiquated and do not 
include a comprehensive limitation on benefits article. 373 The invest-
benefits provision are meant to ensure that at least to a significant extent, one level of tax is 
imposed by the residence jurisdiction. Id. at 155. 
365 H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Policy: Agenda for the Nineties - Toward a New Tax 
Treaty Policy For a New Decade, 9 AM. J. OF TAX POL'y 77, 92 (1991). 
366The treaty negotiations with the Netherlands took years and much of the controversy 
revolved around the limitations on benefits article. Chicha & Johnson, supra note 347, at 1509. 
367 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 347, art. 26; see John Turro, U.S. and Netherlands Sign Tax 
Treaty; Limitation-on-Benefits Article Breaks New Ground, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 1471, 1471 (1992). 
368 Maarten Ellis & Rob Fulke, Limitation-on-Benefits Article from the Dutch Perspective, 5 TAX 
NOTES INT'L 1474,1474 (1992). 
369Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Income Tax Treaty, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., 
art. XI, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH 1995), at 36,438. 
370 Ellis & Fulke, supra note 368, at 1474. 
37\ Van Unnik & Boudesteijn, supra note 349, at 115. 
372 Marlin Risinger, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the EC Directives on Parent/Subsidiary Distribu-
tions, 85TH ANNUAL CONF. ON TAX'N PROC. 19,23 (1992). 
373The United States Tax Treaty with the United Kingdom was signed on December 31, 1975, 
with Ireland on September 13, 1949, with Denmark on June 17, 1980, and with Greece on 
February 20, 1950. Fogarasi et. aI., supra note 345, at 95. None of these treaties includes a 
limitation on benefits article. Id. The treaty with Luxembourg was signed on December 18, 1962 
and contains a limitation on benefits article designed only to protect against the use of special 
investment holding companies. Id. The United States has renegotiated its tax treaties with Austria 
and Luxembourg. Barth, supra note 345, at 1046. Negotiations are underway with Ireland. 1995 
DAILY TAX REpORT, supra note 345, at 142, Gl. 
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ment patterns in Europe are complicated because companies often 
raise their capital from multiple jurisdictions. 374 This phenomenon will 
be exacerbated as the EC achieves its goal of a free capital market. 
Only an EC-wide double tax treaty can adequately address this situ-
ation. Furthermore, negotiation of such a treaty might be the catalyst 
necessary to return reluctant treaty partners to the bargaining table. 
The United States could also bargain for the extension of the Par-
ent-Subsidiary Directive to distributions and payments between United 
States and EC companies,375 given the fact that certain Member States 
have prohibited the application of the Directive where the ultimate 
parent is a non-EC resident.376 The United States could take this 
opportunity to address our treaty partners' concerns over recent treaty 
overrides.377 United States constitutional law allows for conflicts be-
tween treaties and statutes to be resolved by the "later in time" rule 
which means that the more recently adopted rule prevails unless the 
statute or treaty provides otherwise.378 Thus, changes in U.S. law may 
override provisions of a treaty without the consent of the treaty part-
ner.379 Many of the EC Member States are particularly sensitive to treaty 
overrides as their constitutions do not permit such a result.380 The 
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty addresses this problem by providing for con-
sultations within six months in the event that the balance of benefits 
changes by reason of such a treaty override.381 
Administratively, an EC-wide tax treaty between the United States 
and the EC is a project very much worth pursuing. Former Interna-
tional Tax Counsel of the U.S. Treasury, Cynthia Beerbower, had des-
ignated forty percent of her staffs time to negotiate treaties.382 Any 
time savings achieved by such a negotiation could be spent on regula-
374 SeeAnRIAN OGLEY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAX: A MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 149 
(Interfisc Publishing). 
375 Risinger, supra note 372, at 22-23. 
376 See Dieben, supra note 246, at 313. 
377 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAX TREATY OVERRIDE 
(1989). The term treaty override refers to situations where domestic legislation of a nation 
overrules provisions of a treaty. The legislation may contain a provision that the treaty is to be 
disregarded in certain circumstances, or that the domestic interpretation of the legislation may 
overrule a treaty. Id. 
378 McINTYRE, supra note 178, at 2-79; see, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888); 
Reid v. Cover, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957). 
379 McINTYRE, supra note 178, at 2-79. 
380Id. at 2-79 n.306. Some countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and Spain, 
have constitutional arrangements that obstruct the override of treaties by legislative action. Id. 
381 Cope, supra note 360, at 961. 
382 New Treasury International Tax Counsel Discusses Priorities in Meeting with ABA Tax Section 
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tions projects and long-term planning regarding the U.S. system of 
international taxation. The Ruding Committee recommended coordi-
nation of tax treaty policies by the Commission but acknowledged that 
it would be simpler and cheaper for Member States and non-Member 
States to negotiate treaties concurrently with the Commission.383 
As a group, the EC Member States are not yet ready to yield the 
sovereignty necessary to negotiate a single treaty with the United States. 
Until the EC is granted the competence to represent the Community 
as is done in the area of external trade relations, the United States 
could advocate the conclusion of a multilateral tax treaty with the EC. 
The multilateral Nordic Income Tax Treaty between Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden could serve as a model,384 This issue 
could be explored in the context of the EU-U.S. agreement to launch 
a joint feasibility study on the future of bilateral relations.385 The Com-
mission has proposed to extend topics for EU-U.S. summits to include 
macroeconomic and financial affairs and to involve U.S. Treasury, 
ECOFIN, and the Commission in the dialogue.386 The Commission has 
also vowed to ensure that all bilateral tax treaties negotiated by the 
Member States are in strict accordance with the non-discrimination 
rules of the Treaty of Rome and the tax directives. 387 
An alternative approach is to strive towards more uniformity in the 
negotiation of treaties with the EC Member States.388 The Treasury 
Department is currently involved in active or ongoing negotiations 
with Denmark, Italy, Ireland, and Belgium.389 The EC presents a unique 
situation given the level of coordination and information sharing390 
Committee, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 201 (l994).Joseph Guttentag became the Treasury's international 
tax counsel in October, 1994. Tom Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at A5. 
383 Ruding Report, supra note 2, at 379. 
384 Convention between the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Sept. 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ibfd 
File. 
385 EU: EU and U.S. to Launch Feasibility Study On Future Bilateral Relations, Agence Eur., July 
26, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File. 
386 Commission Launches Blueprint to Prepare for Deeper Transatlantic Ties, Rapid, July 26, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File. 
387 COMMISSION RESPONSE, supra note 225, at 15. 
388 Rosenbloom, supra note 365, at 77. 
389 International Taxes: Treaties, Compliance Top Agenda, 1995 DAILY TAX REp. Jan. 6, 1995, at 
4, D72, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnadtu File; see Cope, supra note 360, at 955. 
390 The EC Member States are implementing the directives on banking and exchange of 
information. Cope, supra note 360, at 964; see First Banking Directive, Council Directive 77/780, 
1977 OJ. (L 322) 30; Second Banking Directive, Council Directive 89/646, 1989 OJ. (L 386) 1; 
Council Directive 91/308, 1991 OJ. (L 166) 77. 
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among the Member States and their thrust toward economic integra-
tion. 39] Therefore, extraordinary efforts should be made to offer simi-
lar concessions to each countries' foreign investors. This would relieve 
some concerns regarding treaty shopping between the EC Member 
States and would allow for the drafting of a simpler derivative benefits 
clause. For example, one of the derivative benefits provisions found in 
the Netherlands treaty grants treaty benefits to a Dutch joint venture 
company if three conditions are satisfied.392 The third condition, that 
the Dutch company is not a "conduit company," was added to disqualify 
those joint ventures established to route U.S. interest, royalties, and 
other deductible payments to EC Member States like Italy, a country 
with which the United States has a less generous treaty provision 
regarding withholding taxes at source.393 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To achieve a coherent system of international taxation, the United 
States must take note of how other countries tax international in-
come.394 The EC is especially important not only because of the Mem-
ber States that currently comprise the Union, but also because of the 
many countries that aspire to join. The tax systems of the Member 
States, as well as the evolving body of European tax law, were taken 
into consideration by the EFTA countries as they pursued tax reform 
and are being closely monitored by the Eastern European countries as 
they develop their tax systems. The tax policies pursued by this group 
will have important consequences for global economic conditions. 
Complete harmonization of the EC's corporate tax laws is neither 
likely nor necessary, but movement towards more uniformity is inevi-
391 In response to the Ruding Report, the Commission launched a comprehensive process of 
consultation of the tax authorities of the twelve Member States. See COMMISSION RESPONSE, supra 
note 225, at 2. 
392 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 347, art. 26, para. I (c) iii. The three conditions are as follows: 
(i) five or fewer publicly-traded Dutch companies own, in aggregate, at least 30% of the vote 
and value of the shares in the Dutch company; 
(ii) five or fewer publicly-traded companies that are resident in the United States or states that 
are members of the European Communities own at least 70% of the vote and value of the shares 
in the Dutch company; and 
(iii) the Dutch company is not a "conduit company", i.e., a company that principally receives 
and pays out interest royalties and other deductible payments. [d. 
393Cope, supra note 360, at 969; see Netherlands Treaty, supra note 347, art. 26, para. 8(m). 
Having a model treaty for the EC Member States might give the United States more bargaining 
power to negotiate uniform withholding provisions. 
394 See Kingson, supra note 22, at 1153. 
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table. The Commission will continue to urge the adoption of proposed 
directives such as the Loss Directive. These changes will logically lead 
to a reexamination of corporate tax rates, the tax bases, and the 
treatment of capital gains and losses.395 The thrust toward EMU will 
also facilitate and expedite the tax. harmonization process. The adop-
tion of a single currency will so intertwine the domestic economies that 
the adoption of a common corporate tax system should not be as 
difficult as it now appears. Business pressures and the fear of Commu-
nity preemption may also naturally drive the Member States towards a 
more tolerable alignment of corporate tax systems. Because none of 
the EC countries relies on the corporate income tax as a major source 
of revenue, this process should not be as painful as VAT rate approxi-
mation. 
Specifically, U.S. tax treaty policy should take into consideration the 
direct tax harmonization accomplished thus far and the proposals for 
the future. Although the negotiation of a single treaty with the EC 
would produce significant benefits for the United States both substan-
tively and administratively, the EC Member States are not yet willing to 
transfer their sovereignty to conclude tax. treaties to the Community. 
The alternative is to strive towards uniformity in the tax treaty nego-
tiations currently underway with the Member States. An examination 
of the policies underlying the same-country exception of subpart F 
leads to the conclusion that, given appropriate safeguards, adminis-
trability, simplicity, and economic efficiency can be improved by treat-
ing the EC as a single country for this purpose. 
395 See Frans Vanistendael, Additional Note to Ruding Committee Report: Some Basic Problems 
on the Road to Tax Harmonization (on file with author). 
